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I. *Aim:* The aim of this quarterly shall be to provide a forum (1) for the discussion of Christian faith and life on the basis of the Lutheran confession, (2) for the application of the principles of the Lutheran Church to the changing problems of religion and society, (3) for the fostering of world Lutheranism, and (4) for the promotion of understanding between Lutherans and other Christians.

II. *Policy:* The editors will welcome contributions that are likely to be helpful in the furtherance of the aims set forth above. It will be required of such contributions that they be frank and fair in their discussion of moot questions; that they be free from controversial animus; and that their contents be of real scholarly and practical value to the readers. Difference of opinion between contributors, or between a contributor and the editors, does not of itself exclude articles from publication since the editors do not hold themselves responsible for the opinions of contributors.

THE LUTHERAN QUARTERLY

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Discussion of Intercommunion in German Protestantism

By Eugene M. Skibbe

A DRAMATIC, revolutionary theological discussion has taken place in Germany. The work represents some of the most cautious and persistent thinking of our age, a work which, because it deals with the doctrine of the Lord's Supper, will by its very nature touch the lives of every Lutheran pastor, parishioner, and confirmand.

Since 1947, the year of the formation of the Evangelical Church in Germany (EKD), Lutheran, Reformed, and Union theologians have been in committee working toward a common understanding of the church's doctrine of the Lord's Supper. This discussion concerning the Lord's Supper (*Abendmahlsgespräch*) has been carried on in full awareness of the precedent established between Lutherans and Reformed at Marburg (1529), later agreements set down in the Wittenberg Concord (1536), and the final *damnamus* uttered in Article VII of the Formula of Concord (1577). The results in the form of theses have been published recently in the September 1958 number of *Evangelische Theologie*. Behind these theses lies the highly significant work of the committee. Although very little from the actual proceedings of the discussion has been made public, enough has been released in various German periodicals to provide a background for us.

I

What brought about these discussions? Among the many problems involved in the transformation of the war-time "confessing church" (*Bekennende Kirche*) into the Evangelical Church in Germany (EKD) was the question of altar fellowship between Lutheran and non-Lutheran churches. Such fellowship had not existed in the pre-war German Church Federation. But the Nazi persecution of the church forced Christians of all denominations out of their doctrinal co-existence, made theologians and pastors think more critically than ever before of their own doctrinal presuppositions, and forced these people to work

out, underground, new forms and means for their common life in Christ. Lutherans and Reformed shared the same table of the Lord during the war. After the war, migrating groups of displaced persons were in need of the sacrament even if the ministry of their own church was not available. Thus the question demanding an answer was, Could this war-time "emergency fellowship" be authorized as the norm for a new, official church fellowship? The church convention (June 5-6, 1947) held in Treysa to work out the constitution which would bring the EKD into being optimistically expected this decision to be made quickly. Its "declaration" reveals this:

> 4. Agreement exists herein, that Evangelical church members should not be excluded from a celebration of the Lord's Supper because they belong to one of the other valid confessions within the EKD.
>
> 5. The Church Convention requests that the Council of EKD exert every effort to bring about a binding theological discussion concerning the doctrine of the Lord's Supper in reference to church fellowship.[1]

Here was intended only a moment of cautious hesitation before declaring full fellowship. This "moment," however, has lasted over ten years.

Actually it was obvious even before the meeting at Treysa that the emergency situation could not be a basis for solving this central doctrinal issue. The day before, on June 4, a statement had been issued by the Council of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Germany (VELKD) with reference to its own newly proposed constitution:

> Evangelical Christians from non-Lutheran churches who wish to participate as guests at a Lutheran celebration of the Lord's Supper will be gladly admitted. . . . On the other hand, the granting in principle of pulpit and altar fellowship to all ministers of the churches joined together within EKD cannot be declared by us as long as it is not evident to what extent church discipline will be exercised by EKD.[2]

This was followed up by resolutions adopted by the Smaller Conference (Sept. 11) and the General Evangelical Lutheran Conference (Feb. 1, 1948) which made as clear as possible their evaluation of the Treysa

1 Erwin Wilkens, "Dokumente und Erläuterungen zur gegenwärtigen Praxis der Abendmahlsgemeinschaft in der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland und ihren Gliedkirchen," *Koinonia,* herausgegeben vom Lutherischen Kirchenamt der Vereinigten Evangelisch-Lutherischen Kirche Deutschlands (Berlin, 1957), p. 196. Erwin Wilkens has selected the relevant sections of all official documents dealing with altar fellowship.

2 *Ibid.,* p. 195; for Wilkens' own analysis, p. 192.

)eclaration.[3] Altar fellowship with Reformed churches was in both ases rejected.

This was the situation of German Protestantism immediately be- ɔre the church convention which met in Eisenach on July 9-13, 1948, ɔ pass judgment on the proposed constitution. Pastor Kurt Hutten, 'riting for the magazine *Für Arbeit and Besinnung* in October of that ear, declared in looking back on those days: "The different ways of inking came so clearly to light . . . that it seemed a sheer impossibility ɔ bridge these tensions so as to achieve real unity."[4]

The only solution possible was regretfully to acknowledge that the ɛnsion did exist and to make altar fellowship a goal to be achieved at ɔme future time. The final form of the constitution for the new EKD eflects this:

1. Agreement concerning pulpit and altar fellowship remains the task of the ɛember churches.

4. Concerning admission to the Lord's Supper no full agreement exists within ɛe EKD. In many member churches, Christians who belong to one of the other ɔnfessions recognized by EKD will without reservation be admitted. In no mem- ɛr church will access to the table of the Lord be refused to a Christian belonging ɔ one of the other confessions recognized within EKD where pastoral responsibility r congregational relationships require [granting such] access. The legal church ffiliation and the definition of general church discipline remain in any case un- isturbed.[5]

EKD declared itself to be "on the way"[6] to unity. The discussions con- erning Communion are concrete evidence that this is so, that a way s being cooperatively explored which it is hoped will end in fellowship.

The committee was not on completely new ground. Work of xactly this same kind had been begun just before the war, when the Evangelical Church of the Union (EKU, earlier the "Old Prussian Union") resolved to clarify the theological nature of its union.[7] This

3 *Ibid.*, p. 196; Sommerlath was the leader of the latter group.

4 "Auf dem Weg zu einer Grundordnung der EKD," a three-part series in the section "Langschnitt durch die Zeit" of that magazine, II, 17 (Sept. 1948), pp. 403-410; 18 (Sept. 15), p. 424-433; 19 (Oct. 1), pp. 467-473.

5 *Koinonia,* p. 198.

6 The words of Martin Niemoeller at Eisenach; *Für Arbeit and Besinnung,* II, 19, p. 467.

7 Ernst Wolf, *Evangelische Theologie,* VII (1947, 1948), p. 62. The most accessible American work which reviews the *Hallenser Beschlüsse* is that by M. Reu, "Can We Still Hold to the Lutheran Doctrine of the Lord's Supper?" in *Two Treatises on the Means of Grace* (Minneapolis, 1952), pp. 39-120. Note especially pp. 108, 109.

set off theological discussion which extended over the length and breadth of Germany. Resolution 3, section D, of the EKU's controversial Halle Resolutions (1937) reads:

> 4. The differences existing among us in the doctrine of the Lord's Supper concern the mode of the self-impartation of the Lord in the Lord's Supper. They do not refer to the fact that the Lord himself is the gift of the Lord's Supper.
>
> 6. Therefore the common celebration of the Lord's Supper among us Lutherans, Reformed, and United does not stand in contradiction to the administration of the Lord's Supper in conformity with the Scripture.[8]

It was obvious, of course, that exactly the *mode* of the self-impartation of the Lord forms a most essential aspect of the church's preaching and teaching concerning its Lord. Fellowship with any group which does not take seriously agreement in such preaching would be impossible.

The Council of VELKD and the study fellowship of Lutheran Pastors in the Rhineland immediately answered EKU, affirming again the "true bodily presence [the real presence] of the Lord in his sacrament on the basis of the clear word of Holy Scripture. . . ." The Lutheran Church remained convinced that "its answer to the question concerning the mode of the self-impartation of the Lord in the Lord's Supper is essential for its proclamation of salvation and its doctrine."[9]

This was the problem, as old as the precedent set by Luther at Marburg and the *damnamus* uttered in the Formula of Concord, which EKD now resolved to re-examine. Could conscientious agreement concerning the mode of the Lord's presence in his Supper be achieved?

II

An invitation was issued by EKD: "The task will be to pursue a free theological discussion. The freedom of the discussion will be defined by its obligation to the church, the limit being that the theme should not be dealt with 'in itself.' It must rather be treated in view of that reality which all theology must serve: the life of the holy church and congregation. Three factors will define the discussion: (1) In the church struggle and during the war the Lord's Supper was

8 *Koinonia,* p. 203.
9 *Ibid.,* pp. 203-205.

discovered anew in our congregations. It is simply something that has happened, something that necessitates a theological interpretation and will also affect the relationship among the various communions. (2) The bond uniting us to a confession has not become superfluous. It determines us much more than we had commonly realized. Nor can we carry on the work of theology without regard for this bond. (3) Within New Testament science itself developments have taken place in regard to the Lord's Supper which cannot but affect the life of the church."[10]

From the beginning every effort was made to form the commission from among the most able theologians of Germany. Professor Edmund Schlink was given the over-all direction of the group. For special leadership of the New Testament section Professor Julius Schniewind was chosen. A survey of the list[11] of those invited to the first session (Frankfurt-am-Main, Sept. 3-Oct. 1, 1947) confirms the theological comprehensiveness which was integral to the plan. Of the twenty-one men invited, only nine attended. Two refused because they feared that church politics would play too great a role in the work. The others could not attend simply because in 1947 travel was virtually impossible.

The problem of the mode of the Lord's presence appeared immediately at the center of the first discussion. Two Lutheran theologians presented papers.[12] Ernst Sommerlath gave a report epitomizing, from

10 *Abendmahlsgespräch,* edited by Edmund Schlink (Berlin, 1952), p. 5.

11 Professors Günther Bornkamm* (Göttingen), Peter Brunner (Heidelberg), Oskar Cullmann (Basel-Strasbourg), Friedrich Delekat* (Mainz), Hans Joachim Iwand (Göttingen), Joachim Jeremias (Göttingen), Ernst Käsemann* (Mainz), Walter von Loewenich (Erlangen), Otto Michel (Tübingen), Alfred de Quervain (Basel-Bern), Hermann Sasse (Erlangen), Heinrich Schlier (Bonn), Edmund Schlink* (Heidelberg), Julius Schniewind* (Halle), Eduard Schweizer (Zürich-Mainz), Fredrich Karl Schumann (Halle), Ernst Sommerlath* (Leipzig), Ethelbert Stauffer* (Bonn), Heinrich Vogel* (Berlin), Otto Weber* (Göttingen), and the moderator of the Reformed Federation, Pastor Wilhelm Niesel. Those marked * accepted; among these Weber represented the Reformed Church, Sommerlath the "confessional" Lutheran Church. All others were members of Union Churches, though this fact is, of course, no designation of their individual confessional position. Other representatives of the Reformed Church had been invited but were unable to attend (Schlink, p. 14).

Although I know of no published list of all participants, I know that at later dates Brunner, Iwand, Jeremias, and Schweizer took part. When the invitation was widened (cf. below), Bizer, Dietzfelbinger, Herntrich, Gollwitzer, Kreck, Kuhn, Oepke, and E. Wolf were among those participating.

12 The exegetical paper was originally assigned to the moderator of the Reformed Federation, Eduard Schweizer. He could not attend.

In addition, Jeremias' series of 13 Theses ("Zur Exegese der Abendmahlsworte Jesu," *Ev. Theologie,* VII (1947/48), pp. 60-62, were sent prior to the meeting to those invited. Because Jeremias also was unable to attend, specific discussion of them was postponed (Schlink, p. 6).

his own standpoint, "The Situation of the Problem of the Lord's Supper."[13] Julius Schniewind led the group in joint exegesis of pertinent New Testament passages. "None of the participants will ever forget the leadership of Schniewind, as thorough as it was fiery, nor his power to open up to all participants a fellowship in listening and speaking . . . ," says Schlink in reporting this first meeting.[14] This exegesis was then summarized by the leader in a "Report Concerning a Discussion of the Lord's Supper."[15]

Noticeable in both of these papers is the irenic tone, the effort on each man's part to bring to the center of attention theological statements agreed upon by both Lutherans and Reformed. Concerning the significance of the "real presence," Sommerlath quoted Karl Barth: "The humanity of Jesus Christ as such is the first sacrament." This he said, "is a good Lutheran thought which Luther not only had expressed but had also related to the structure of his doctrine of the Lord's Supper."[16] Schniewind repeatedly stressed those points on which both Lutheran and Reformed exegetes were in agreement.

But also evident in these two key-note papers are the tensions which exist within Lutheran thought itself.[17] Both men agreed that Christ is really present in the Lord's Supper. But what is the nature of his presence? Is he present primarily as body and blood or primarily as person? Body and blood, according to Sommerlath, are not just "things" but bring us into contact "with the entire Christ, with his person, the *Urgrund* of his life. But all this dare not be said too quickly. It dare not be said at the expense of this, that the gift of the Lord's Supper is first of all not his 'person.' . . .[18] The gift is much more

According to these theses, Jesus' words were a double parable. In addition, Paul's view of the Lord's Supper (together with the Synoptic Passover presentation) is also symbolic. He concludes, "Having a share in the Messianic salvation-community (*Heilsgemeinde*) and having a share in the propitiatory power of Jesus' death is, also according to Paul, the gift of the Lord's Supper." *Ev. Theologie,* VII, p. 62.

13 "Der Stand der Abendmahlsfrage, eine systematische Besinnung," printed in Schlink, *op. cit.,* pp. 23-54. Additional comments in the form of a letter sent afterwards to Schniewind are also included, pp. 20-22.

14 *Ibid.,* p. 6.

15 "Bericht über ein Abendmahlsgespräch evangelischer Professoren in Frankfurt am Main," *ibid.,* pp. 9-19.

16 *Ibid.,* p. 40.

17 The general situation is somewhat one-sidedly portrayed by Reinhold Koch, *Erbe und Auftrag: das Abendmahlsgespräch in der Theologie des 20. Jahrhunderts* (München, 1957), pp. 47 f. This book has a current bibliography.

18 Cf. also Schlink, p. 21.

'body' and 'blood.' "[19] This non-personal "thingness" (*Dinghaftigkeit*) of the Lord's Supper serves to free us from all of the vacillations and uncertainties of the personal life and gives to us the deepest peace.[20] In saying this Sommerlath strongly combats the nineteenth century concept of "person," i.e., person as opposed to "body" and "nature."[21]

Schniewind replied to this problem of "person and thing" in the last section of his report.[22] For him John 1:14 was the answer. The Logos did not become a thing, but the Logos became a real man who stood under our curse of death. "In every doctrine of the Lord's Supper must be preserved that the gift is Christ in person."

The sharply defined difference between these two men did not touch the mode of Christ's self-impartation. The Lord is present and the impartation is direct. The issue, rather, was Christological. What is the nature of Christ's presence? It was at this point of difference within Lutheranism that agreement between communions had to be and could be reached. The papers presented later by Kuhn, Käsemann, Schweizer, and Delekat all contribute to an understanding of this problem.

The first meeting had been a successful beginning. All members wished the work to continue. To this end Schlink and Schniewind made the following plans: It would be necessary to safeguard the discussions from premature publicity and from church politics; the number of participants must be increased; and the commission must be given a longer time for its work than had originally been allotted. Proposed for a second meeting was (1) a report by Schniewind on John 6, (2) reports by both an exegete and a systematician on the topic, "Justification by faith and the Lord's Supper," and (3) two reports concerning the basic intent of Luther's Small Catechism and the Heidelberg Cathechism. For a third meeting was planned a critical examination of (1) the Wittenberg Concord and (2) the Halle Resolutions of 1937. Certain New Testament problems would also require more detailed treatment. The plan of attack was obviously directed at the historical and confessional issues. This plan was abandoned because of the demand among participants for a more exclusive New

19 *Ibid.*, p. 47.
20 *Ibid.*, p. 48.
21 *Ibid.*, p. 39.
22 *Ibid.*, pp. 16-18.

Testament approach.[23] We shall see how, later in the course of the discussions, Peter Brunner, aware that any attempt by the committee to side-step these troublesome confessional issues would be fatal for the success of the work, called the committee back again to these basic issues.

III

A thorough analysis of each of the meetings is out of the question. But the golden thread of the "real presence" appears and reappears in the fabric of the entire discussion, and by tracing this theological thread we can gain an insight into the significance of the discussion.

New Testament topics were the agenda for the second session (April 6-7, 1951) in Hamburg. The two papers presented reveal the dilemma in which the historian finds himself. The historical theologian has been able, on one hand, to penetrate deeply into the world of the New Testament. On the other hand, however, when compelled to interpret the life and thought of this world, he is able to present only relative, problematic results. The divergence in the results and interpretation between two very able form critics illustrates this.

The paper by Prof. K. G. Kuhn, "The Original Meaning of the Lord's Supper and its Relation to the Dead Sea Scrolls"[24] was read first. Mark 14:22 is not a liturgical expression of the early church but is a *logion* spoken by Jesus at the Last Supper. In speaking to his disciples, Jesus did not institute a cultic meal for his followers. The basis for the eschatologically joyous meal celebrated in the Palestinian church (Acts 2:46) is to be sought in the daily meal fellowship of Jesus with his disciples. Thus, although both the *logion* and the cultic meal are of Palestinian origin, they are, nevertheless, independent traditions.

St. Paul was the first to associate the *logion* with the meal. He interpreted the *logion* as the institution of a cultic act, as the added words, "Do this in remembrance of me" (I Cor. 11:24, 25) reveal.

23 *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.

24 "Ueber den ursprünglichen Sinn des Abendmahls und sein Verhältnis zu den Gemeinschaftsmahlen der Sektenschrift," *Ev. Theologie*, X (1950/51), pp. 508-527. (This comparison is not new. Cf. RGG "Abendmahl" by Heitmüller, Column 38.) For the article expanded and translated, cf. *The Scrolls and the N. T.*, ed. by K. Stendahl (New York, 1957), pp. 65 ff.

Thereafter, Greek Christians believed that through bread and wine were communicated the body and blood of the risen Lord.[25]

Neither in Acts 2 nor in I Cor. 11 but only in the Marcan *logion* can the "original meaning" of the Lord's Supper be found. The sacred meal of the Essenes helps to throw light on the situation. Jesus could not have thought of a *communio*. Rather, he speaks and acts a "double parable," dramatizing the significance of his coming death. "As all partakers of the meal share in the bread and the wine (distributed with the benediction before and after the final course), so also all share in the propitiatory significance of his death, his offered body and his shed blood."[26]

In his paper, "Critical Remarks Concerning the Problem of the Lord's Supper in the Synoptics,"[27] Käsemann also employs the form-critical approach to the New Testament. But in his estimation, the theologian is denied any glimpse of the Maundy Thursday Supper. The New Testament presents not an exact record of Jesus' words and actions, but later teachings (liturgical) of the church about Jesus. We are not to ask, What do Jesus' words mean? but What does the *church's testimony* mean? A summary of Käsemann's thesis shows the difference between him and Kuhn. "Mark and Paul stand very close to each other in their understanding of the celebration of the Lord's Supper. Not the action, but the elements, are also the mid-point for Mark. Our attention is directed to the fact that the creaturely means dispense divine powers through which man is seized by the *Kyrios*. Mark definitely did not think 'symbolically'; the point for him was also the 'real presence' and its redemptive power."[28] The earliest glimpse given to the theologian of the Lord's Supper in the life of the church shows that the meal already had a sacramental significance.

The agreement and disagreement of these two men are typical of modern exegetes. Historical theologians, driven hard by certain exacting presuppositions about reality and history, reach results which are

25 The most noted representative of this thesis was Hans Lietzmann, *Messe und Herrenmahl* (Bonn, 1926), p. 253; Note 2, p. 255.

26 Kuhn, *op. cit.*, pp. 526-527.

27 "Kritische Bemerkungen zum Synoptischen Abendmahlsproblem." This has not been published. A summary of it is given by P. Brunner, *Grundlegung des Abendmahlsgesprächs* (Kassel, 1954), p. 12. For Käsemann's thorough treatment of Paul's view of the Lord's Supper, cf. *Ev. Theologie,* VII (1947/48), pp. 263-283.

28 Brunner, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

often highly probable and contradictory in nature. Friedrich Delekat was one who felt this keenly. "For a moment it appeared, in fact, as though the continuation of the discussion was hopeless. While the differences between exegetes were other than those which had separated the Reformers, still in number and in magnitude they were no less important."[29] The doctrine of the Lord's Supper could not rest on this shifting ground. The two speakers at the third session held at Hanover, Oct. 13-15, 1952, further documented this situation.

Eduard Schweizer's paper analyzed "The Johannine Witness to the Lord's Supper."[30] The theological relativity into which modern exegesis can lead us was clearly epitomized.

The Synoptics and Paul show us that the eating of the bread and drinking of the wine were originally separated from each other by an entire intervening meal. For this reason the problem centering in the elements, i.e., whether or not the bread is the body or the wine is the blood of Christ, could never have occurred to the early church. What either a Jewish or Greek Christian thought of the elements was determined by their basic metaphysical presuppositions and by the respective liturgical settings. If, according to Schweizer, we could have asked one of the first Christians to explain the elements, a Jew would have answered as a Reformed pastor now does, a Greek would have answered as a Lutheran. The task of exegesis, then, is to separate these differing presuppositions from our particular application of the text.

Is the Johannine interpretation of the Lord's Supper different from the Synoptic? Instead of presenting a simple picture of the Supper, John employs the tradition didactically. The sacraments are signs in which Jesus is present and encounters the hearer. They point doggedly to the reality of Jesus' incarnation. They are, for John, the sharpest possible polemic against docetism. "The Lord's Supper is therefore that last, most offensive witness that Christ is to be found only in the One who has come in the flesh (*sarx*). To participate in the Lord's Supper is to recognize this fact."[31] Schweizer affirms the real presence of Christ in the Supper. The Lord, however, is not bound

29 Friedrich Delekat, *Theologie und Kirchenpolitik* (München, 1955), p. 7.

30 "Das johannesiche Zeugnis vom Herrenmahl," *Ev. Theologie,* XII (1952/53), pp. 341-363. Concerning this report, cf. also, "Kann die Auslegung der Abendmahlstexte des Neuen Testamentes für das Abendmahlsgespräch der Kirchen hilfreich sein?" by Albrecht Oepke, *Theologische Literaturzeitung* (March, 1955), pp. 129-142.

31 *Ibid.,* p. 359.

to the elements, but to "the event of proclamation through Word and sacrament."[32]

With Schweizer the exegetical phase of the discussion of the Lord's Supper ended. At the same meeting the dogmatic treatment of the subject was initiated with Friedrick Delekat's thesis, "Methodological and Dogmatic Problems in View of the Present Exegesis of the Texts for the Lord's Supper in the New Testament."[33] The historical problems inherent in modern critical theology was pointed up clearly in this report.

What we demand from the exegete is that he establish for us absolute historical certainties. But the fact is, such certainty is both unessential to faith and impossible to attain through a methodological investigation of past history. We cannot reconstruct the original Last Supper. Even if we could, we cannot relive the Supper.[34] Therefore, such attempts to reconstruct the past are not normative for our dogmatics. If this is true, then any problems about the original celebration and meaning of the Supper must be subordinated to the simple but transcending fact that the meal was celebrated in the time between Jesus' death and our first literary account of it from the year A.D. 45. The liturgical-practical tradition, then, leads us to a period of time prior to our first literary sources.

What specific solution to dogmatic problems does Delekat offer? First of all, our explanation of how Christ is present in the Supper depends upon our understanding of his bodily resurrection and the mystery of Easter. Further, what is historically certain for the dogmatician is that the early church's faith in the presence of the Lord was inseparable from their celebration of this meal. Finally, Delekat directs our attention again and again to the *fact* that the church celebrates a sacred meal; it is for him a rock in the midst of the tumultuous relativity created by historical investigation. "Every interpretation of the "how" of his presence—be it symbolic-realistic or symbolic-idealistic —runs the danger of slipping out of eschatological into historical time. . . . From this it follows that the actual observance of the Lord's Supper has, over against all doctrines of the Lord's Supper (yes, even inde-

32 *Ibid.*, p. 365.

33 "Methodenkritische und dogmatische Probleme angesichts der gegenwärtigen Exegese der neutestamentlichen Abendmahlstexte," *Ev. Theologie*, XII (1952/53), pp. 389-415.

34 Delekat points out the association of the presuppositions of the historical-critical method with the idealism of Ranke's method of historical research.

pendent of the personal faith of the administrant and the communing congregation) a thoroughly independent primary significance."[35]

IV

The discussions, beginning with the introductory summary of the situation by Sommerlath and the elementary, "fiery" exegesis by Schniewind slowly resolved into a thorough and frank examination of the method, results, and relevance of historical research for the dogma of the church. But, although each contributor had related himself to the preceding line of thought, no one had ventured to bring together the various strands of thought into a comprehensible whole. This task, that of a dogmatic evaluation of the discussion from the Lutheran and Reformed points of view, was assigned respectively to Professors Peter Brunner and Walter Kreck for the fourth meeting held in Berlin-Schwanenwerder, May 11-12, 1954.

Of what relevance has this seven-year discussion been to the original problem within the EKD, that of intercommunion?

Kreck began his report, "The Reformed Doctrine of the Lord's Supper in View of the Present Exegetical Situation"[36] with the warning that his presentation could hardly avoid being somewhat preliminary and subjective. Three difficult problems had faced the Reformation Fathers: (1) The distinction between *res* and *signum,* reality and sign, (2) the *certo loco* or locality, of Christ's humanity, and (3) the *manducatio impiorum,* or eating by unbelievers. As to the first problem, modern research has shown us that St. Paul spoke much more realistically than Calvin or the Heidelberg Catechism ever allowed.[37] Kreck noted that "the *est* of the Lutheran thesis must, in its kernel of truth, be presupposed." Calvin himself realized this in his commentary to

35 *Ibid.,* p. 406.

36 "Die reformierte Abendmahlslehre angesichts der heutigen exegetischen Situation," *Ev. Theologie,* XIV (1954), pp. 193-211.

37 This does not mean, in Kreck's mind, that modern exegesis supports the traditional Lutheran view. Lutherans do support their position by making use, for example, of Käsemann's results. But it is obvious that Käsemann's main thought, that it is the Spirit which is the gift in the Lord's Supper (cf. *Ev. Theologie,* VII, pp. 267, 271), is no longer the "classical" Lutheran doctrine of the *materia coelestia.* Neither Lutherans nor Reformed dare put the results of modern investigation into the frame of the 16th century problem. Modern research must be taken as a whole, in context, on its own grounds, or else the *Abendmahlsgespräch* will be hindered rather than helped. This principle of Kreck's, which he himself exemplified, was an important contribution.

Matt. 26:26.[38] But although the distinction of *res* and *signum* is secondary, it is nevertheless a necessary distinction. For if Christ meets us and deals with us in his Word, how can the Lord's Supper be other than a "guarantee" or "seal" for what he does? In the final analysis the Reformed theologian must agree with Schniewind's words from the first session: "In every doctrine of the Lord's Supper must be preserved that the gift is Christ in person."[39]

Concerning the locality of Christ's humanity, Kreck stated that both Lutherans and Reformed had failed to be satisfied with Christ's presence in his Word. In order to guarantee access to Christ for each seeker, the Lutherans have bound him to the elements. Out of this emerged the problem of the *manducatio impiorum.*

Modern exegesis has shown us that I Cor. 10:21 and 11:28 ff. can be so understood that only the believer receives Christ. The question is, Is the unworthy person judged primarily because he eats as an unbeliever, or primarily because of the unbelief itself? Lutheran doctrine is inadequate here. "Word and sacrament are not just God's Word in an easily accessible form. They are this, however, in that they repeatedly become this (that is the justification of the Reformed criticism). But that they do become this—that what is promised really happens here and now—is no questionable hope; it is something which dare be and ought to be believed on the basis of the sure promise of God."[40] Here the Lutheran position is emphatically justified.

Kreck had joined the preceding exegesis to the dogmatic problems which separated Lutheran and Reformed theologies. His results proved a willingness to compromise his own dogmatic position on the basis of new exegetical evidence. Kreck had made a concrete step toward essential consensus. This was the goal toward which the commission had been working.

In contrast, Brunner's report, "Basis for the Discussion Concerning the Lord's Supper"[41] seemed a step backward to most members

38 Vera igitur non signo tantum monstratur, sed re ipsa quoqua exhibetur carnis Christi manducatio. Kreck, *op. cit.*, p. 200.

39 *Ibid.*, p. 212, quoting Schlink, p. 17.

40 *Ibid.*, p. 210.

41 *Grundlegung des Abendmahlsgesprächs* was published in a booklet together with "Das Heilsgeschehen in der Wortverkündigung und im Abendmahl," a section taken from Brunner's contribution to *Leiturgia*, edited by K. F. Müller and W. Blankenburg, Bd. I (Kassel, 1954).

of the commission. Instead of the forward-looking willingness to compromise, Brunner turned his attention to the unpopular topic of the Reformation Confessions.[42] Though the Confessional writings had been central to the original plan[43] of the discussions agreed upon by Schlink and Schniewind, this plan had been almost immediately rejected. The result was that the Confessions had never been officially dealt with by the commission. Brunner's step toward concrete consensus was to face squarely the sixteenth century origin of the controversy and insist that only in faithfulness to the Confessional act of the church could the desired agreement concerning Lord's Supper and church fellowship be achieved.[44]

For Brunner, two most essential questions must be answered before the discussion could rest upon a lasting foundation. First, do the present Lutheran and Reformed churches really have the same Confessional structure as the Reformation churches of the sixteenth century? The fact that each church belonging to the EKD requires an ordination vow, at the heart of which stands the promise to teach and preach according to one of the Reformation Confessions, seems to indicate that this continuity exists. Yet the fact is obvious that since the sixteenth century the rise of historical criticism has brought about an evaluation of the Scriptures and of traditional Christology which differs in many respects from that of the Reformers. In view of the present critical theology, do our ministers still actually teach according to the Confessions? In addition, there has arisen in recent theology the view that what alone constitutes the church is the preaching of the Word, while Confessional guides are contrary to the essence of the church. Do our ministers actually hold the Confessions to be of any value whatsoever? "Does not the ordination vow rather rest upon a fiction, upon an enormous *as if?*"[45]

42 He says of his publication, "It is in this case not the agreement of the hearers which prompted me to publish this lecture, but the lively opposition with which it has been received by the large majority of theologians," p. 7. Friedrich Delekat's book, *Theologie und Kirchenpolitik* (München, 1955), is dedicated to a discussion of the Brunner thesis (p. 12). Oepke, in his article in *Theologische Literaturzeitung, op. cit.*, openly questions the validity of the thesis, as does Ernst Bizer, "Lutherische Abendmahlslehre?" *Ev. Theologie,* XVI (1956), and Ernst Rietschel, *Ev. Theologie,* XVIII (1958), p. 271.

43 *Op. cit.,* pp. 7-8.

44 Delekat also points this out in *Kirchenpolitik,* pp. 11-12.

45 Brunner, pp. 15, 19.

If we allow modern theology to relativize the Confessional basis of the problem, then all that remains for the commission, according to Brunner, is to establish "how in some way one element of the New Testament teaching finds its after-effect in one Confessional church and another element appears again in another Confessional church."[46] This had been Eduard Schweizer's conclusion.[47] Brunner challenged this relativity. Although the New Testament shows evidence of variety of teaching, essential are the limits it draws over against false doctrine. This definitive element lies at the basis of the Reformation Confessions. It is such a confessing act to which the church is called today. "This burden [that of being a Confessional church] has become greater because of the change in the intellectual-cultural situation in comparison with that of the sixteenth century. But the change of situation has not brought about a change in the essence of the church. The church is, for the sake of the message entrusted to it, a church distinguishing between right and false doctrine until the final day. Only there, where we perceive that we are one in confession of the Gospel, and thus also in the demarcation over against heresy, can we acknowledge each other as standing in the unity of the church, in church fellowship."[48]

Brunner's second question is, Given the fact that conflicting Confessional statements exist and are held valid among churches of EKD, how are we to evaluate them? The answer of the EKU,[49] that conflicting Confessional statements are to be understood simply as "*theological* teachings *about* the Gospel" and do not touch the essence of the Gospel itself, is false. For one thing, this contradicts the very intention of the Confessions. In addition, the fact that full fellowship in the Lord's Supper does not exist in EKU shows that differences in doctrine are decisive even for EKU. Finally, "those contents of the doctrine of the Lord's Supper expressed in the Lutheran Confessions which contradict the doctrine of the Lord's Supper in the Heidelberg Catechism prove by the very substance of that which they advocate to be indispensable

46 *Ibid.*, p. 19. In reading Brunner's report, one must keep in mind the problematical nature of the results of the historical-critical method, p. 11.

47 *Op. cit.*, p. 9.

48 *Ibid.*, p. 22.

49 "We hold to the standard interpretation of the constitution (Grundartikel) of this church, which Joachim Beckmann has interpreted in *Kirchliches Jahrbuch* (1950), pp. 67 ff., as being the opinion of the General Synod." *Ibid.*, p. 23. For Beckmann's earlier relation to the EKU as well as his present relation, cf. *Koinonia*, pp. 210-212.

elements . . . in the apostolic Gospel."[50] The Lutheran Confessions claim to teach correctly what the nourishment given in the Lord's Supper is. This for the Lutheran Church is an integral part of the Gospel and not a theological teaching secondary to it.

The problem of conflicting Confessions within the EKD can be resolved in only one way. First of all, the binding authority of the respective Confessions must be recognized. Only after perceiving their essential part in the church's life can we proceed to analyze them, test them over against the New Testament, and reevaluate their claim upon us. Brunner concludes by giving thirteen theses which outline the way "to overcome these differences through jointly formulated doctrinal statements, and with this to prepare for an agreement on the Lord's Supper for the present church."[51]

This did not conclude the work of the commission. The discussions, following the principles set down by both Kreck and Brunner, entered into a new phase of work. Two separate sub-committees, made up of members of the commission, were appointed to formulate theses which would represent the work of the previous discussions. These two groups finished their work on Nov. 2, 1957. Publication was delayed until the Council of the EKD accepted the final theses on July 25, 1958. The theses answer this question, *What do we, as members of the one apostolic church, receive as the decisive content of the biblical witness concerning the Lord's Supper?*[52] A theological analysis of these theses must await another occasion. The commission itself declared: "What

50 *Ibid.*, p. 27. Brunner's own view of the "real presence" is given in the second part of this booklet. "The body . . . is not a piece of a human body (*Menschenkörper*), not a piece of a dead or even living body substance (*Leibsubstanz*). . . . The body of Jesus is not given to the disciples as a mere physical body. This presented body is, first the true corporeal humanness (*Menschsein*) of Jesus in its FOR-YOU-character. . . . The body of Jesus, which he gives to the disciples in the bread, is in fact HIMSELF, the one who, united in his entire corporeal humanness with the Logos, is given up for us." "Also in the poured out blood of the *covenant* it is the Lord, who was given up for us in death, who effects our salvation through his death, himself corporeally present for us. He HIMSELF, in his sacrificial work is the drink, whom we receive bodily with the mouth and spiritually with faith," pp. 61-62. Similar to Schniewind's statement (p. 6) is this by Brunner, "The encounter with the gift of the Lord's Supper remains always personal encounter with Christ himself," p. 77.

51 *Ibid.*, p. 32. This would also involve agreement concerning baptism, p. 33. Agreement has been reached; cf. *Okumenische Rundschau*, II (May, 1958), p. 856.

52 "Was hören wir als Glieder der einen Apostolischen Kirche als entscheidenden Inhalt des biblischen Zeugnisses vom Abendmahl?" Found on pp. 425-427 of *Ev. Theologie*, XVIII (1958). The eight theses were signed by the following men: Bizer, Bornkamm, Brunner, Delekat, Gollwitzer, Iwand, Jeremias, Käsemann, Kreck, Kuhn, v. Loewenich, Meyer, Michel, Niesel, Schlink, Schweizer, Vogel, Weber, Wolf.

the results of the previous work mean for the question of altar fellowship and church fellowship must be given further theological consideration. The manner in which the work has been pursued up to now has, in the view of the commission, justified itself and leads us to expect that further progress along the controverted pathway will not remain unfruitful."

V

The Lutheran Church has always maintained that doctrinal agreement and theological discussion such as exemplified above is basic to church fellowship. It is from this perspective that we evaluate the work of the commission.

The act of discussion itself has been a positive accomplishment. Even though a free, yet responsible, theological encounter such as this one does not result in formal unity, its yield in the realm of greater understanding, appreciation, and cooperation will be great. Similar discussions—for example, the conversations between Lutherans and the Church of South India—have demonstrated this. We can justifiably anticipate far-reaching, beneficial results from the labors of the EKD's commission.

But a paradox characteristic of ecumenicity is that consensus between certain groups sometimes leads to even deeper schisms and more separate groups within Christendom. The German free churches,[53] as well as groups in the United States, may interpret the consensus as "unionism." Werner Elert declared in 1947 concerning the proposed commission: "No church leadership, no church delegation, no somehow authorized negotiator can declare as binding a priori or a posteriori another doctrine for the Lutheran Church without thereby doing flagrant injury to the Lutheran Confessions."[54] This danger of "union-

53 The Twenty-fourth General Synod of the Evangelical Lutheran (Old Lutheran) Church (Sept. 1947) resolved: "The General Synod recognizes that church fellowship of our church with all churches directly or indirectly belonging to the EKD is, according to Augustana VII, in principle no longer possible." On April 13, 1948, a meeting of representatives of the free churches agreed to withhold judgment in this matter until after the EKD was finally formed. (*Für Arbeit und Besinnung,* II, 17, p. 406.) The Twenty-fifth General Synod (Oct. 1954) resolved: "The General Synod notes with thankfulness that since the General Synod of 1947 much has happened within the Lutheran Landeskirchen to strengthen the Lutheran confessional attitude. This allows us to work together in various areas." A study commission was formed to investigate fundamental and practical relations with the VELKD (*Koinonia,* p. 238).

54 *Für Arbeit und Besinnung,* II, 17, p. 405.

ism," however, has been counteracted by the work of Peter Brunner (cf. supra).

Further, the discussions demonstrate in a most dramatic way, both the positive values and the distinct limits of modern New Testament research for dogmatics and the teaching ministry of the church.

There is, finally, no clearer portrayal of Lutheran intentions than in such a discussion as this. Thesis II, 6, formulated at the Third World Assembly of the LWF, reads: "The words 'it is enough' give Lutheran churches a freedom also in relation to other churches. Bound by them we are led to the Scriptures and so rescued from the pressures of institutional expediency as well as from complacent acceptance of the status quo. In an ecumenical study of the Scriptures we find the most hopeful means toward a fuller realization of the unity in Christ and toward a deeper understanding of our faith as found in and behind our Confessional statements. On this basis also the questions of intercommunion and the nature of the sacraments can be brought out of the present deadlock. For our Lutheran churches it is a congenial and timely task to participate in and initiate such ecumenical studies—on the highest theological as well as on the parish level."[55]

Report of the Commission

For understanding the cooperatively formulated and unanimously accepted theses concerning the Lord's Supper:

The following theses were cooperatively formulated and unanimously adopted on Nov. 11, 12, 1957, after extensive previous study by the EKD commission on the Lord's Supper. Based on the recent results of New Testament exegesis, they express what theologians within the EKD adhering to the Lutheran, Reformed, and Union churches can jointly answer concerning the problem of the nature, bestowal, and reception of the Holy Supper.

These theses do not claim to offer a full theological exposition of the doctrine of the Lord's Supper. For this reason members of the commission have felt free to omit certain detailed expressions which seem to them to be important. They are, however, convinced that nothing essential for an understanding of the nature, bestowal, and reception of the Holy Supper has been omitted just for the sake of compromise.

What the results of the previous work mean for the question of intercommunion and church fellowship must be given further theological consideration. The manner in which the study has been pursued up to now has, in the view

55 *Messages of the Third Assembly,* Lutheran World Federation (Minneapolis, 1957), p. 106.

of the commission, justified itself and leads us to expect that further progress along the controverted pathway will not remain unfruitful.

What do we, as members of the one apostolic church, receive as the decisive content of the biblical witness concerning the Lord's Supper?

THESIS I

1. The Lord's Supper which we celebrate is based on the institution and command of Jesus Christ, who has given himself for us in death and who is our risen Lord.

2. In the Lord's Supper the exalted Lord invites his followers to his table and gives to them, even at this present time, a share in the future fellowship in the kingdom of God.

THESIS II

1. In the Lord's Supper Jesus Christ, who is present in the Holy Spirit through his Word, acts in that which the church does.

2. Like the sermon, Baptism, and the special consolation of the forgiveness of sins [absolution], the Lord's Supper belongs to the means by which Christ bestows on us the gifts of the saving Gospel.

THESIS III

1. The Lord's Supper is an act of worship by a congregation assembled in Jesus' name.

2. In the Lord's Supper the meal is inseparably joined with the proclamation of Jesus' saving death.

3. Together with prayer, thanksgiving, and praise, bread and wine are taken, the Lord's words of institution are spoken, and bread and wine are offered to the congregation to eat and to drink.

4. In the Lord's Supper we commemorate the death of Christ through which God has once and for all reconciled the world to himself, and we confess that the Lord is present among us in this meal and, as those called to perfect glory, joyfully await his return.

THESIS IV

The words spoken by our Lord Jesus Christ with the giving of the bread and the chalice express for us what he himself gives in this meal to all who participate: The crucified and risen Lord, in his body given for us all in death and in his blood shed for us all, grants that we partake of him through his Word of promise with the bread and wine. He thereby lifts us up by virtue of the Holy Spirit into the victory of his Lordship so that we, who believe in his promise, shall possess forgiveness of sins, life, and blessedness.

THESIS V

Therefore, what happens in the Lord's Supper is not adequately described (a) if it is taught that bread and wine are transformed by the Lord's words of institution into a supernatural substance, so that bread and wine cease to be bread and wine; (b) if it is taught that in the Supper a repetition of the event of salvation is accomplished; (c) if it is taught that in the Supper a natural or supernatural substance is offered; (d) if it is taught that it involves a parallelism of physical and spiritual eating as two separate procedures; (e) if it is taught that the physical eating as such makes blessed, or that sharing in the body and blood of Christ is a purely spiritual procedure.

THESIS VI

1. Jesus Christ, who has rescued us from God's deadly and wrathful judgment, is both the beginning and the crown of a new creation.

2. Through him we who receive his body and blood are incorporated into his body, the church, and becomes participants of the promised new covenant which God has instituted through Jesus' blood.

3. The Lord's Supper places us in the community of brethren and therefore testifies to us that Christ has overcome that which subjects and separates us in this world. In the midst of forgiven sinners he establishes the beginning of a new humanity.

THESIS VII

1. The Lord's Supper places us in the way of the cross of Christ. The cross of Christ points us toward reality in this world. Where we are weak, there God's grace is strong. When we die, we shall live with him. Yet his victory is hidden under trials and suffering. Therefore the Lord nourishes us through his meal in order to arm us against all false religion and apathy. This he does so that we neither anticipate the future with empty dreams nor in despair give up our tasks.

2. As members of the community to whom he gives himself in the Lord's Supper, we are all brothers. This fellowship is grounded alone in that love with which he first loved us. As he has assumed our burden—the righteous One for us who are unrighteous, the free One for us who are bound, the transcendent One for us who are downtrodden—so, too, ought we to share all that we are and have with those in need.

THESIS VIII

1. Faith receives what is promised to it and builds on this promise, not on its own worthiness.

2. God's Word warns us against every irreverence toward and misuse of the Holy Supper lest we call God's judgment down upon ourselves by sinning against the majesty of this gift.

3. Because the Lord is generous to all who call upon him, all members of his church are invited to his meal, and the forgiveness of sins is promised to all who desire God's righteousness.

Those declaring their agreement to the preceding theses, together with the preamble, are: Bizer, Bornkamm, Brunner, Delekat, Gollwitzer, Iwand, Jeremias, Käsemann, Kreck, Kuhn, v. Loewenich, Meyer, Michel, Niesel, Schlink, Schweizer, Vogel, Weber, Wolf. [Translated from *Evangelische Theologie,* XVII, Sept. 1958, pp. 425-427.]

Lutheran Unity and Union in Historical Perspective

By Richard C. Wolf

IN ANY discussion of church unity and church union in American ecclesiastical circles it becomes almost mandatory to define the terms "unity" and "union."

The necessity of definition stems from the fact that frequently no distinction whatsoever is made in the meaning and usage of the two terms, and they come to be considered synonymous and interchangeable. That this occurs is no accident. It is a sobering reflection of the degree to which the ecclesiastical sphere has been penetrated by the motifs of "centralization" and "consolidation" which are widely considered prime hallmarks of our times.

It is this absence of distinction between "unity" and "union" which makes it so difficult here in America to talk about Christian unity without arriving at the place where we find ourselves talking about actual church union. Quite frequently the impression is given that the chief reason for the existence of the National Council of the Churches of Christ, and, indeed, of the World Council of Churches, is to facilitate the creation of one gigantic church union both here in America and throughout the world.

By definition "unity" and "union" are so distinctly different in meaning as to preclude haphazard confusion. Consequently definitions which make the distinctions clear are in order.

"Unity" is "a state of being one." It is a matter of philosophy, attitude, and direction; it is a relationship of agreement, concord, and uniformity. At this point it should be noted that "uniformity" also needs definition because of the insistent confusion of it with "conformity." There is a vast difference between the two; the first is voluntary and self-produced internally while the second is enforced and superimposed externally. True unity is always productive of uniformity, not of conformity.

"Union" is "an act," and in modern understanding it is an or-

ganizational "act of uniting," of joining formally, organizationally, functionally two or more things into one.

"Unity" and "union" are not synonymous. In the treatment of "unity" Webster's *Unabridged Dictionary* adds a special paragraph to specify that there is no real synonym for unity; that "union" does not constitute a synonym; that the two terms are frequently mistaken for each other. "Union suggests either the act of bringing two or more things into one, or the resulting state; unity denotes the state of being one, or the property of oneness. It may be predicated of what is simple or of a close and intimate union in a complex whole."

These definitions, and their distinctions, suggest that it is quite possible to achieve unity without engaging in union; that it is equally possible to achieve union without possessing unity; that it is no less possible to achieve a union born out of and expressive of unity.

It will be well to consider another factor which will play a comparatively large role as we try to erect an historical perspective from which to view Lutheran unity and union movements. This factor is the characteristic pattern of societal forms in which the motion is from smaller units into larger units, from independence or relative independence of units into interdependence of units and to final dependence of units upon a central formation which may or may not be created by, representative of, and answerable to the units now dependent upon it.

When this central formation is the result of unity, it is achieved by the consent and the delegation of power by the dependent units, and the similarity of the dependent units is the consequence of inherent uniformity.

When, however, the central formation has been laid upon the units without their consent and in violation of their powers, the resultant similarity of the dependent units is the consequence of conformity.

When this centralized authority is the result of unworthy motives, such as desire for sheer size, or the aspiration for prestige, or the tyrannical drive of the power motif; or when this central authority, having been created by the consent and cooperation of lesser units, proceeds to arrogate to itself powers, rights, and functions not delegated to it by consent of the units which joined to create it; or when this central authority employs unilaterally such powers, rights, and func-

tions as have been delegated to it in such a way as to command compliance from the lesser units—when such things occur, either singly or in combination, then the delicate line which distinguishes uniformity, created by a consent derived from unity, from conformity, created by pressure derived from power, is obscured and men find themselves constrained toward union under the central authority, whether they are in true unity or not.

The record of history indicates that those periods and movements marked by conformity have been periods and movements which signalled the eventual decline of the organism in which conformity became the criterion for acceptance.

The record of history also indicates that the decline of an organism in which conformity becomes the criterion of acceptance happens only when the units which joined together by consent to form that organism have lost their individuated attributes of independence, responsibility, and answerability. Conformity arises only when there has been an abdication of the rights and principles and powers which originally marked those units which now elect to conform. They conform at the price of abrogating the very possessions which gave them existence.

History has one more passage. When such an abdication and abrogation of principles, rights, and responsibilities become dominant within a society or a societal form, then that society or societal form has become moribund.

On the basis of these preliminary observations let us now look at some phases of the history of the Lutheran Church in America. A close study of documents relating to Lutheran unity and union has convinced the writer that a pattern is discernible which may be of some importance to at least a partial understanding of the present position of the movements for both unity and union among the Lutherans in America.

The first stage of the pattern took place in the early years of the eighteenth century when individual Christians of Lutheran conviction joined together, by free consent, in real unity, to form congregations. Their aims were to promote their mutual welfare and well-being in the Gospel, and to create a more powerful and effective witness to the Gospel than they were able to effect individually. They joined with one another on the basis of agreement and unanimity. But there were Lutherans who did not join in forming these congregations. There

were dissenters who opposed the movement toward orderly congregational organization and who refused to take part in it.

Some of the dissenters feared that the establishment of congregations would produce a clerical dominance. Others opposed the increased financial obligations which came with organized congregational life. Others, notably in Pennsylvania, found religious liberty a heady potion and were quick to reject any type of organization which tended to restrict their self-assumed and self-determined "liberty." Henry Melchior Muhlenberg observed, "Some strange things go on here in Pennsylvania, and Judges 17:6 expresses it well, 'In those days there was no king in Israel, but every man did that which was right in his own eyes.' "[1]

Some ministers with irregular calls, and some unscrupulous charlatans with no clerical standing whatsoever, took advantage of the disorganized situation to gather their own congregations. In some places money tried to rule, for "whenever a wealthy Jock, George, or Conrad received some slight affront or is not honored enough, it occurs to him that he can build his own church and exercise the *jus episcopale* and *patronatus.*"[2]

These people, and others like them, wanted nothing to do with the organization of orderly, ecclesiastically regular congregations. They dissented and disagreed, and because they were not in any sort of unity with those who formed the first regular congregations, they stayed out, and in staying out guaranteed the internal unity of the newly founded congregations.

The second stage of the pattern emerged when those congregations which were in unity with one another, unity of concern for the Gospel, unity of concern for the church, unity of concern for the functioning of the congregations and the lives of individual Christians, joined together into voluntary larger units, which were various designated assemblies, conferences, synods, or ministeriums.

The earliest of these voluntary larger units to originate in America came in 1735. Pastor William Christopher Berkenmeyer had the foresight to insert into the constitution adopted by his congregation in New York City, and eventually adopted by the majority of congregations

1 *The Journals of Henry Melchior Muhlenberg* (hereafter cited as *"Journals"*), Vol. I, p. 112.

2 *Journals,* II, p. 109.

in New York and northern New Jersey, a special section which provided for an "assembly" of representatives from congregations to deal with unusual situations. When a controversy between pastors, or between a pastor and his parish, or between congregations arose, the situation was to be considered by the "assembly," called specifically to deal with the immediate problem. After the assembly had dealt with the emergency, effectually or ineffectually, it was to disband. Just such a meeting was held in 1735 to adjudicate a disagreement between Pastor John August Wolf and his congregations. Although this meeting has been called "the Synod of 1735," it was not a synod in the sense in which that term is normally used. This was a temporary assembly designed to meet a particular local issue, and when the local issue was met the "Synod of 1735" disbanded. No permanent organization was intended or effected.

The second of these early larger units set the pattern which has existed down to the present day. The "United Congregations," which ultimately came to be known as the Ministerium of Pennsylvania, came into being in 1748 as an intentionally permanent organization. In unanimity and consent the congregations delegated to this voluntary, permanent relationship such powers and functions as were necessary to produce a stable, effective central organization.

The congregations which federated were in unity and agreement about doctrine, organization, structure, and the relative power of the synod and the congregations. Muhlenberg explained the relationship of the congregations and the Ministerium carefully because some of the congregations were afraid of the new body, "for they knew how the ecclesiastical consistories in Germany ruled over the peasants, etc.,"[3] but after the arrangements for the Ministerium had been explained "they could see no danger in our form of government and organization . . . , but rather an advantage."[4] They were reassured by the fact that the Ministerium claimed no legal power over the congregations[5] and made no attempt to dictate the selection of pastors. The "Ministerium can do no more than make a proposal. The congregations have the right to elect. . . ."[6] The Ministerium was estopped from

3 *Journals,* I, p. 290.
4 *Ibid.*
5 *Journals,* II, p. 512.
6 *Journals,* II, p. 549.

arbitrating disputes unless both parties involved gave their consent to such arbitration.[7]

Once again those who disagreed with the erection of synods employed their privilege of abstention. They stayed out of the organizations and frequently expressed their dissent in emphatic terms. Some, like Valentine Kraft, were opposed to regular synods because they had formed their own, personally oriented "organizations."[8] Others insisted that the larger organization would impinge deleteriously upon the independence of the congregations,[9] and still others went so far as to impugn the motives and integrity of the leaders of the movement for larger, federated, coordinating units.[10] Their refusal to join the "United Congregations" and their attacks upon that body only served to underscore and reinforce the unity in which the congregations had bound themselves together.

The third stage of the pattern came into being when these larger units began to join forces for a united witness, mutual support, and a better expression of the unity which rested among them.

As in the earlier stages, these still larger units were created by consent and implemented in federated and coordinated function. They were based on doctrinal accord, sometimes specified, sometimes understood. They were so designed as to insure that the newly erected central authority would be both responsible and answerable to the constituting units.[11]

There was, however, considerable difference in the degree of power and authority delegated to the central bodies which now came into existence. The Lutheran General Synod was not permitted "to possess, or arrogate unto itself, 'the power of *prescribing* among us *uniform ceremonies of religion* for every part of the Church'; or to introduce such alterations appertaining to the faith . . . as might in any way tend to burden the consciences of the brethren in Christ."[12] It was "not to

7 *Journals,* II, p. 512.
8 *Journals,* I, p. 68.
9 *Journals,* I, p. 643.
10 *Journals,* I, pp. 222, 243 f., 381.
11 "Plan Entwurf" of the General Synod; "Fundamental Principles of Faith and Church Polity" of the General Council.
12 "Constitution of the Evangelical Lutheran General Synod, in the United States of North America," Article III, Section II, paragraph 3.

be looked upon as a Tribunal of Appeal," but "may give advice or opinion, when complaints shall be brought before them."[13]

On the other hand, the General Synod in the Confederate States of America (later The General Synod in North America) was declared to be "in all cases of fundamental doctrine or church discipline, the highest court of appeal. It shall hear and decide upon all questions of difficulty or complaints concerning these, which may be referred to them by whole Synods, Ministeriums, congregations, or individual ministers, which decision shall be final and binding."[14] Furthermore, "The General Synod shall furnish a uniform Order of Service, which shall be observed in every part of the Church."[15] However, by the time the General Synod in North America merged into the United Synod of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in the South, a marked shift had taken place. The United Synod possessed powers "only of an advisory and recommendatory character in all matters, except such as pertain to the general interests of operations of the Church. . . . In regard to these, it shall be invested with such powers as the Synods composing it may delegate to it."[16] "In its operations, it shall not interfere with the legitimate work of the Synods in its connection."[17]

The General Council was formed on a basis designed to be more consultative and advisory than that of the General Synod. It was to be "A free, Scriptural General Council or Synod, . . . all decisions of which . . . bind . . . those Congregations which consent, and continue to consent, to be represented in that General Body."[18] Nevertheless, "If the final decision of any General Body thus constituted seem to any Synod within it to conflict with the faith, . . . it is the duty of that Synod to take such steps as shall be needed. . . . To this end it may withdraw itself from relations which make it responsible for departure from the faith . . . or for an equivocal attitude toward it."[19]

The last of the major unitive bodies formed in the nineteenth cen-

13 "Constitution . . . General Synod . . . ," Article III, Section V, paragraph 1.

14 "Constitution of the General Synod of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in the Confederate States of America," Article V, Section 1.

15 *Op. cit.*, Article V, Section 2.

16 "Basis of a More General Union Among the Evangelical Lutheran Synods in the South," III, Its Powers.

17 *Op. cit.*, IV, Its Sphere.

18 General Council, "Fundamental Principles of Faith and Church Polity; of Ecclesiastical Power and Church Polity," Section VI.

19 *Op. cit.*, Section VIII.

tury, the Synodical Conference, was and remains exactly what its name specified, a free conference with no power or authority over its participants.[20]

In the creation of these varied central agencies there was little, if any, evidence of conformity. Dissenters were related to each movement—dissenters who either did not join the movement or who withdrew when it became clear that they were not in accord with the organization in which they had temporarily participated.

The Tennessee Synod waged a long battle against the General Synods, both North and South, on grounds both doctrinal and organizational, and was largely responsible for the shift of position we have observed in the formation of the United Synod in the South. Tennessee felt no unity with the two General Synods. It recognized its unity with those who joined with it to form the United Synod.

The Ministerium of Pennsylvania withdrew from the General Synod because an important segment of its membership considered the general body an impediment to long-standing relations with the Reformed and to a possible unification of the Lutherans and the Reformed in Pennsylvania. Later, after having rejoined the General Synod, the Ministerium resumed a separated position—this time largely because it espoused a somewhat more sharply delineated doctrinal position than that of the General Synod. However, part of the cause of its withdrawal was the conviction that the General Synod had tried to exercise power over its constituent Synods which had not been delegated to it. These elements of dissent with regard to the General Synod were implemented positively in the formation of the General Council in which the Ministerium was joined by other groups in basic unity with it.

The General Council in its turn underwent dissent. Although a representative of the Lutheran Synod of Missouri, Ohio, and Other States attended and participated in the sessions in which the Council was formed, the Synod did not become part of the Council. It was firmly attached to the medium of "free conference" as the only proper way to achieve unity. It was equally opposed to the organizational structure of the General Council.[21] In turn the Synod of Wisconsin,

20 The Synod of Missouri, Ohio, and Other States to the General Council, 1869, in *Documentary History of the General Council of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in North America,* p. 158.

21 *Ibid.*

the Joint Synod of Ohio, the Iowa Synod, and the Illinois, Michigan, and Minnesota Synods parted company with the General Council because of absence of unity on the "Four Points."[22]

The Synodical Conference drew all these dissenters, with the exception of the Iowa Synod, together for a time. Then the Joint Synod of Ohio withdrew. A controversy arose over election and predestination. The Joint Synod dissented from the interpretation of these doctrines which was then widely accepted in the Missouri Synod. It also disagreed with the Synod's insistence on treating "the difference . . . as a point of separation between churches."[23]

We have traced the patterns of developing larger bodies down through the nineteenth century, noting the consistent reactions of dissent which prevented some units from sharing in one movement, but whose very unity in dissent led to the creation of another movement. Obviously there was no large measure of conformity for the sake of "belonging."

The twentieth century has ushered in what appears to be still another stage in the pattern. The larger units of the earlier period have coalesced, or are about to coalesce, into still larger units. The unions which have already occurred in the present century (namely, those which formed the Evangelical Lutheran Church, the United Lutheran Church, the Joint Synod of Wisconsin, and the American Lutheran Church) have been marked by the same characteristics as those of the earlier periods. They have been based on unity with regard to doctrine and practice. They have been for the purpose of expediting and enhancing the work of the church. Now at mid-century we are approaching the creation of even larger units.

In this stage of the pattern some disturbing phenomena may be discerned. Concern for position and prestige appear as motives for seeking union. A leader in the merger which formed the United Lutheran Church wrote to a fellow leader, "It is my belief that we ought go over the whole unity question thoroughly . . . and ought to take the time to look into and discuss the future and to formulate some beneficent plan. If we do not, I believe the West will try to wrest the leadership of the American Church from us. The Federative move-

22 *Documentary History . . . General Council,* pp. 324-336, 270, 274.
23 Evangelical Lutheran Joint Synod of Ohio and Adjacent States, *Minutes,* 1881.

nent out there, and the successful merger of the Norwegian Church have given them new ideas."[24]

The mood of conformity seems more discernible than in the earlier periods. Dissent there has been, but at a lesser level than previously. The Norwegian Synod was formed by dissenters from the position taken by the new Norwegian Lutheran Church (now E.L.C.) on election and predestination, and affiliated with the Synodical Conference. The Lutheran Free Church, the Eielsen Synod, and the Church of the Lutheran Brethren abstained from the Norwegian merger, each with its own reasons for dissent. The Augustana Synod felt that the arrangements for the United Lutheran Church allocated too great power to the central body and that it could perform its most effective work in an independent position. It therefore withdrew from the General Council and did not participate in the formation of the United Lutheran Church.

There is evidence, however, that many other dissenters of the modern period have not felt sufficiently strongly, or sufficiently strong, to go their own ways. They have registered their dissent from within, sometimes effectually, sometimes ineffectually. Several examples will illustrate this. The "Pittsburgh Articles of Agreement," drawn up to facilitate a possible merger between the American Lutheran Church and the United Lutheran Church, produced a sharp dissent within the United Lutheran Church. The dissenters protested that they were being called upon to agree to a position which was not in accord with the historical position of the United Lutheran Church and with which they, as representatives of Synods and as individuals, were not in accord. They felt that the unity of the United Lutheran Church was being jeopardized in the interests of a union not marked by actual unity.[25] The merger was not achieved, and these protests played a part in demonstrating that the two bodies were not yet ready to unite. A second example is the strong protests of the Joint Synod of Wisconsin[26] and the Norwegian Synod[27] against what these bodies consider "union-

24 T. E. Schmauk to G. G. Scherer, April 2, 1917.

25 The United Lutheran Church in America, *Minutes*, 1940, pp. 565-568.

26 "Communication from the Evangelical Lutheran Joint Synod of Wisconsin and Other States," *Proceedings of the 43rd Regular Convention of the Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod*, pp. 505-507.

27 "Action of the 38th Regular Convention of the Norwegian Synod of the American Evangelical Lutheran Church, as Adopted June 24, 1955," *Proceedings . . . Missouri Synod*, pp. 508-514.

ism" on the part of the Missouri Synod. The harmony of the Synodical Conference has been disturbed, but the Conference has not been fractured, although the Norwegian Synod in 1955 declared "that fellowship relations with the Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod are suspended."[28] It remains to be seen whether the dissent will lead to modification of the position of the Missouri Synod to restore the "unity" which the dissenters feel is threatened, or to a fracture of the Synodical Conference, or whether the mood of conformity will tend to hold the Conference together in the absence of internal unity.

The demand for conformity also seems evident when it is urged that points of difference regarding articles of agreement be not raised lest the progress already made toward union be impeded or undone. This indicatory mark of the call for conformity has been discernible at certain points in the merger negotiations now being pursued by various segments of the Lutheran Church in America and may possibly point to a desire for union taking preference over the desire for unity.

If the sociological pattern which we traced at the beginning of this article is valid, this seeming decline in the incidence and strength of dissent, this possible emphasis on union rather than unity, these indicatory evidences of a call for conformity may well be warning signals that we stand on the verge of entering into a new and dangerous stage of the pattern we have been following.

In this potential new stage we could face the spectre of a centralized authority over which the lesser constituting groups have lost control; a centralized organization which wields its powers unilaterally in such a way that it is no longer representative of and answerable to the groups from whose consent it originally derived its powers; a centralized authority which dictates its will to its member bodies rather than fulfilling the united will of its member bodies; a centralized organization the component parts of which have abdicated their attributes of independence, responsibility, and answerability in the interests of conformity. If such a spectre becomes a reality, history indicates that we may be moving into the final stage of our pattern, with full decline, dependent only on how long it takes to vitiate the vital strength of the organism which, as the "Fundamental Principles of Ecclesiastical Power and Church Polity" of the General Council make clear, rests

28 "Action . . . Norwegian Synod . . . ," *Proceedings . . . Missouri Synod,* p. 513.

in the congregations. "The primary bodies through which the power is normally exercised, which Christ commits derivatively and ministerially to his Church on earth, are the congregations."[29]

We have not entered upon this stage of the pattern, nor shall we as long as the Holy Spirit is active in the lives of the individual Christians who in the unity of the Spirit have been called and gathered into congregations, for the presence and power of the Holy Spirit makes it impossible for Christians, individually and collectively, to abnegate their rights, privileges, and powers, both spiritual and ecclesiastical, to any organization or agency. The primary task of the Christian church remains to witness with integrity and power to the Gospel of Jesus Christ, and this is essentially the province of Christians individually and in and through their congregations.

29 *Documentary History . . . General Council,* p. 181.

Some Reflections About Law and Gospel

By Paul L. Holmer

ONE of the dangers of preaching is to lose all reference to specifics with which men are acquainted. The perorations can then be impressive, the rhetoric sweeping, and the terms even biblical; yet the whole effort can sail by without any effect. Every public speaker, no matter what his subject, knows about these dangers, but very few speakers are in sufficient command to do anything about them.

The contrast between the speeches of William Jennings Bryan and Woodrow Wilson is a case in point. Wilson spoke soberly and yet with infectious passion about justice, duty, international order, and dozens of other abstract matters. He commanded a wide audience. Bryan, on the other hand, was rhetorical, but invariably about specifics. His speeches were concrete and almost vulgar; Wilson seemed, by contrast, ethereal and spiritual. Both men had sufficient power to appeal to diverse groups, and seemingly for different reasons: Wilson attracted everyone until he began to instantiate his abstract terms, when his listeners fell away; Bryan attracted everyone whose experience included silver, fundamentalism, professors, and the fear of Eastern domination, and the rest of the Americans thought he was close to insane.

I

Preaching can fail at two extremes too. Sometimes the educated clergy get so enamored with theology that they actually preach a series of abstractions, and then it is only a step, a short one too, from theological abstractions to other kinds of ethereal orders of being. Thus even the most orthodox-sounding cleric can easily be deluded into thinking that other abstractions, like justice, democracy, fair-play, health, are part of the heavenly panoply. Because the same efforts of thought, usually simple habits, lead us to generalities and abstractions, theological and secular, it is not too difficult a transition from sin, righteousness, justification, and faith to the less theological but inclusive

ideals of a society. All of them seem to be of good report, and few there are who can resist thinking about things, especially when it seems apposite and easy.

Sometimes the non-religious man who begins to meander over the immense field of abstractions and generalities moves in the opposite direction. A college president of my acquaintance, who has long since forsaken the content of the Christian witness, recently sent me his annual declamation, designed apparently for the general welfare of the race. He added the remark that I would surely see that he was still pious. If fondling big terms and translating verbs into nouns is going to count in heaven, we must content ourselves with the prospect of an eternity with the verbose. What passes as Christian piety, not least among the founding fathers of this country but also among university and college people today, is frequently nothing but an exaggerated regard for idealities decked out as the foundations of the world.

But there are also preachers who are very specific. They tell anecdotes and spike the Gospel with all kinds of facts and rumored facts. This other extreme dwells exceedingly in the mundane and in everyday occurrences. Sometimes there are clergy who are inordinately proud of being plain and ordinary. They celebrate being average on no less an authority than Abraham Lincoln, who believed that God's preference was for the statistically preponderant. However it is with God—and this is moot only in another context—the sermon of a clergyman who thrives on religious democracy is clear enough. He is frequently concrete; he lists sins; he notes the effects of belief and unbelief; and he usually omits the general concepts. He likes to bend human interest around the particulars, and the particulars are seldom remote or difficult.

However, there is a danger in this too. If the particulars spoken of are occurrence in the life of Paul, or even of the preacher himself, it does not follow that they must happen to everyone who listens. Much of the specifying of the works of the Spirit as well as the works of the Evil One is very wisely left to each man. The preacher can err here by doing too much. The insistence of Lutheran and other Protestant traditions to go lightly on all of this is wise both theologically and homiletically. For one of the unfortunate consequences of a preaching style which strains after the historical instance is the fact that it can and does create the impression that the Gospel is a third-person story,

about others who were more spiritual, vivid, and blessed. Both theological abstractions, then, and a too closely specified story can betray the inclusiveness of God's love and care.

It is perhaps appropriate here to note that the most serious deviations from the Gospel are seldom those which are perpetrated deliberately and with dispassionate calm. Rather is it true that those which really delude are those which are inadvertent and casual. The preacher is much more important here than the theological professor, for he is the one they hear and by whom they are persuaded. If he is misled by theology to forget the particulars, if he is misled by the religious flavor of daily life to forget what theology tells him about God in Christ, then he fails his listeners. His is the task of moving freely from the particulars to theology and back again.

The point of these remarks, however, is not preaching itself but the distinction between law and Gospel as this is used in Lutheran preaching. Few aspects of Lutheran theology have been so solicitous of allegiance as this distinction; and few theological points get so often preached to the laymen as this one. One cannot deny that the latitude of specification that is permissible is almost a sign of validity, for the point of the distinction is to distinguish almost all the varying and indefinite energies of life from those of the Gospel. Yet the distinction becomes ambiguous too, for where everything counts, nothing counts. The distinction does not always distinguish the Gospel from everything else, despite its scope and sweep. It sometimes misses its mark simply because it is misunderstood; and the misunderstanding is apparent enough if a little effort is spent to ascertain what the laity have really made of the preaching.

II

One of the ever needful corrections within the orbit of the church is the critique of excessive repute given a good life. Lutherans usually handle this matter under the crude rubric "pietism." In American Christianity, at least, it has been altogether too easy to identify the Christian life by reference to a catalogue of virtues. Lutheran preachers have been well taught to spot the deficiency in theological definition at this point. The difference between law and Gospel does not permit one to define obedience to law as obedience to the Gospel. However, what

is a matter of theological definition, a conceptual matter, is not necessarily a religious and moral mistake. So the man who does not drink, smoke, or watch the Yankees on Sunday may really need moral strengthening in these very pursuits. If he has problems, they probably are twofold: (a) What do these things add up to? (b) How can I do what I believe I ought to do? He, like everyone else, might well be concerned with the very ambiguous issue of trying to figure out what point there can possibly be in further effort and, correlatively, with the issue of trying to control his desires and acquire a little plain character and form to his life. There is nothing whatsoever wrong with such concerns; but if he has been led to believe that being a Christian is a matter of compounding temporal virtues into eternal bliss, then he ought to have Paul's words to the Romans made clear for himself. And theology has this sound and important task of instructing him where proclivity and custom and mores will surely deceive him.

Nothing in the Gospel gives us the right, however, to make light of another man's moral necessities. Of course, all of us are frauds part of the time. Our moral life is not deeply grounded, and we are often not lively moral agents but simply by-products of culture and time. It must be granted that preaching, either of law or of Gospel, has the virtue of stripping us of facades that hide our moral lack. But, assuming that there is a measure of moral authenticity and an indigenous moral concern, the Christian commands no perspective by which to denigrate a moral enthusiasm in his fellow man. Men can be pacifists, prohibitionists, anti-vivisectionists, vegetarians, both inside and outside of Christian theological belief. They can be these things—and a multitude more too—out of deep conviction. We neither know enough empirically as to how or why men become decisive in behavior (whether "we" approve is an altogether different question), nor do we command enough detail in either the moral *or* the theological order to deduce necessary relations between beliefs and conduct. Both the facts about human dispositions and motives, and the principles by which we predicate so-called "right" behavior, are pretty well hid to our view; and we do well to remember this as we work with people from moment to moment.

It is a conceptual mistake to identify the Gospel and the Christian life by adding up what we think are its moral commensurates. Such category mistakes can be cleared up by a little theological analysis.

However, it is a serious moral mistake, more serious than the definitional one corrected, to use this kind of theological analysis to cause a person to take lightly his own concerns with good and evil, right and wrong. Or perhaps the issue ought to be rephrased. No one ought to be uninterested, unconcerned, dispassionate about his own existence. Maybe this is the familiar use of the law in another form. But if so, then it is important to point out even verbal repetitions of the correct uses of the law do not insure the avoidance of error. For the importance attached to being theologically correct about this matter might be the way in which one loses interest in one's own existence.

That the law is a schoolmaster and hence has an ostensible pedagogical function has been said again and again. But the pedagogical is jeopardized if its functions are forecast too many times. Just as the teacher is dubious who keeps talking about his intentions, so, too, does the preacher inure his congregation to the schoolmaster's power by discussing its temporary prowess. If the law has a function, then that function ought not to be anticipated in the abstract. Another way to make this point is to indicate that the abstract truth about the law's function is not itself that function. The function is behavioral; the theology about the function, even if true, is no substitute for the former. No congregation of persons needs to be a hot-bed of theologians; men need the law more than they need the definition thereof.

In order, then, that the preaching of law and Gospel be relevant, it is most essential that the abstractions "law," "Gospel," etc., be embedded in the sermon and not made objects of religious worship. In fact, the abstractions could well afford to be hidden. The Christian life is never a kind of doting over the advantages of Gospel over law, nor is it a celebration of moral laxity. If the distinction between Gospel and law makes sense, then it is also true that the story of Jesus is full of grace and truth precisely for those who know their need. And that need is found in moral exercise and concern. Luther and other Christians have long since noted how complex and how confused the world has made this message. But is it not ironic that the very distinction by which the Gospel should be made clear also becomes the means of confusing it? For, at best, any intellectual distinction which helps to describe existence does not exhaust it. No general account of God's relation to man is a substitute for my specific relation to him. Sometimes the preaching of law and Gospel has been clarifying of men's

thoughts about Christianity, but it remains a question whether it now serves to stimulate those other factors in human life whereby God's grace becomes needful.

III

The law-Gospel distinction sometimes suffers another disability. As an abstract expression, a kind of universal in discourse, the notion of law no longer quite carries the connotation that it once did. In Luther's day, for many centuries preceding, and a couple, perhaps, thereafter, the notion of law was apparently popular, widespread, and packed with certain conative and regulative elements. Luther and other writers, before and after, could take for granted a kind of respect for law and laws. Homiletically the law-Gospel distinction had distinct advantages over other points of departure. Law was a native and indigenous point of departure.

For not only were the idea of, and word for, law immediately negotiable, but it was also true that legal elements within societies were pronounced and eminently operative. One does not have to read long in ancient and medieval literature (and later, too) to discover how apparent, how omnipresent and pervasive, law was compared to what it is in many twentieth-century societies. We have, indeed, many more laws on the statute books today, but our laws have an almost biologic and adoptive function rather than a straightening moral effect. Our Puritan forebears were confirmed believers in the higher and invisible law, and they were not slow to try to relate every legislative law to what they thought was the universal moral order. But numerous stresses of human conduct and the American environment have made men much less confident that the higher law could ever be written law.

Many crucial questions of fact can be raised about this change, but a negative kind of fact seems clear enough. A modern man seldom feels obliged by a law; he is seldom motivated by a legal command; he is only infrequently fearful of a law. Furthermore, our norms of conduct are not any longer engendered by legal sanctions. Once the expression "law" bespoke all kinds of norm and conduct inducing behavior. The combination of actual law and the belief in a higher law, moral and awful, was extremely powerful. Whether we agree or not with the trend, the idea of natural law (or the corresponding notion

of the higher moral law) has become only a polite mode of speech; and positive legislation is now thought to be governed only by proximate needs, and laws are accorded only the respect due temporary and pragmatic devices.

Maybe it is the case that a new battle has to be fought for the revival of doctrines of moral law and of natural law. Tradition seemed to have it that positive laws, even habits and virtues, were but a shadowing of the invisible realm of true and just law. All kinds of moral and theological seriousness have been directed toward such metaphysical notions. The irrelevance of much of contemporary theological discussion is never more apparent than when said discussion fails to take account of this shift in view.

It seems unlikely that the propagation of the Gospel can await the new metaphysicians or the resurrection of the old ones. Neither can one deny the high seriousness and noble pathos that the traditional idea of law seemed to encourage. Whatever Luther's corrections of the metaphysics of theology, whatever his wise use and substitution of biblical categories for those of the pagan ancients, whatever the extension of the notion of law to include common moral phenomena, still Luther had another kind of advantage altogether. The term "law" was a serious one and was an open sesame into pathos. The modern preacher has to create the pathos first and then stretch and contrive the term "law" to include all kinds of elements which it no longer contains in our worldly tongue.

To put the matter in another form, the contemporary individual seldom is challenged or ennobled or even frightened by the law. Not even the theoretician any longer says that laws make one good. We are in the middle of a national crisis concerning adjudication which demands certain kinds of social behavior of groups of individuals toward Negroes; but even this conflict is between two different conceptions of what law is feasible and appropriate. The notion of ultimate validity by which differences are to be settled ceases to have awe as the Supreme Court defines its own role as arbiter.

Our culture is highly dynamic and fluid today. Its pushes and pulls are not created by imperatives and commands, except in the rare instance. Two factors, which for centuries were held within the restraints of tradition and inactivity, now are the most demanding and propitious. Where men once assumed an inequity, and even

permanent inequity, of worldly goods, there is now surprising equality and opportunity. Where men once assumed that natural law created the estates of men, modern education has entered to make estates and orders of society highly temporary. When there were limited economic and educational opportunities, the law and ethical goals gave the only common definition to everyone's future. Today a peculiar kind of economic providence, coupled with new ways to market oneself on many educational marts, has increased the scope of everyman's hopes.

Everybody in America can desire, in very meaningful and promising ways, something besides virtue. He can yearn and earn his way into all kinds of lesser Elysia. And the means to fulfilled hopes is provided by education. F. H. Bradley, in the nineteenth century, could still write about everyman's "station" and its "duties." No one today would dare to suggest for anyone else what these might be, for all of us would be quick to point out that one's station and responsibilities depend upon money, position, education, and other circumstances. We have remarkably flexible ways to win and to fail, all of them short of works of the law in the conventional mode of speech. The point is that our theological rubrics have hardly kept up with these novel ways of being impelled, stimulated, attracted, and even compelled.

It is not mine to deny here that the law-Gospel distinction might still apply. But it applies only with a strain, for none of the particulars by which we illustrate the general term "law" today are themselves laws. In these times it is a chase after prosperity and goods, upgrading and education, that is the mark of seriousness. None of these aims are adumbrated by moral principles, for most of them are novel and have hardly been assessed. Besides, most men have very scant courage in resisting what seem so obviously to be perfections of the natural man. Economic wherewithal and know-how seem like harmless goals, despite the fact that they have quite usurped the time and energies of most people. Our norms, our goals (such as they are), our strivings now have their loci in these dynamisms in our society.

This seems to me to provide the reason why most people do not understand what it means to fail before the law. It is only by reading into law whatever we want that we can identify the frustrations of ourselves as failures to do what the law commands. In point of fact, most men fail today where they could not have failed before, because they lacked the opportunity economically or educationally. Or it may

be that they do not make the grade socially, but even this is a novel phenomenon. None of these failures are obviously failures before the law. Neither is the sense of guilt so clearly oriented as theological descriptions sometimes say, and once again the difficulty is that guilt is seldom clearly conceived as a consequence of moral wrong-doing. More likely is guilt considered today, by both the doer and the students of behavior, to be a consequence of tactical mistakes, not failures before God.

There have always been differences of doctrine and theory on such matters. But the built-in feature of today's society militates against law-talk, whereas the built-in feature of earlier societies suggested it. It was once both true and plausible to discuss the Gospel by reference to the law; today it may still be true, but it is no longer plausible. With sufficient refinement and a kind of skillful theological packing, the meanings that matter perhaps can still be made clear, but this seems the long way around. Most people acknowledge failure when they fail to realize all kinds of personal potentials. Their hopes and wishes, their agonies and despair, are rooted in those areas where their expectancies are the largest. I suggest again, in contrast to previous times, that this is no longer an ethical matter, at least in the parlance of this world.

It may be the task of the church to subjugate the various concerns of our day and to show that they are morally loaded nonetheless. Maybe the conception of law is subtle and wide enough to include all of these things once again. Short of such accomplishment, however, it might be well to admit that the law-Gospel distinction does not now distinguish meaningfully. It remains part of the task of theology to name things properly and to keep the teachings of the Bible clear and germane. But it is also time that economic aggrandizement and educational betterment be brought under God's order too. The way it is now, most listeners to sermons never see that they are being included under the law, for the works of the law do not seem to include play with these new engines of society by which we are now making our good life. If the sermon does not make clear that prosperity and competence, along with virtue, will not take him to heaven, then the sermon has missed its mark.

It is not widely germane, certainly, for a modern preacher to insist on the dangers of good works or the subtle lapse from the Gospel in virtue of believing in works-righteousness. These words are not

denotative any longer. The speech is archaic and helps create the delusion that the Gospel is for the infirm and the old-fashioned. It does not help much, either, to have the preacher simply modernize the expressions by adding some new twentieth-century predicates. We are going to have to get used to educated and non-educated members of the congregation who have no such words in their vocabularies and who have no experiences which demand such words. The penultimate goals of aspiration and effort today are things, and they are described in "thing-words"—homes, incomes, cars, foods, schools, degrees, ever more glamorous sex and women. These are difficult to have as if you had them not! The virtues which are immaterial and non-sensual were a little easier to be spiritual about.

The warning explicit in the Gospel is that believing in anything less than God's Word is surely to be lost. But so few people today really believe (in any lively sense of believe) in the goals of contemporary activity; instead, they simply live this way unreflectively. Even the law, as talked about by John Adams, by Aquinas, and by Luther, was a livelier object of lively belief. This consideration presses the issue even further, however, and indicates the difficulty of convincing people that they are actually guilty of something when they do not conceive of their having committed themselves at all.

It is a tragedy, though perhaps a minor tragedy in God's economy of grace and truth, that the term "law" seems to many hearers like an invented artifice by which preachers occasionally gloss over the facts of life. Perhaps it would be embarrassing for many clergymen to discover how abstruse and artificial many parishioners think these matters are. But we do live in startling days, and the clergy are not exempt.

The fact with which all of us must learn to live is plain enough. For example, years agone, as both Kenneth Galbraith and Kenneth Boulding have reminded us,[1] man's labor was directed to staying alive. He could afford no other economic or cultural goals. Today it is otherwise, for only a fraction of time must be spent to stay alive; and the rest of one's money and leisure can be spent as one chooses. The goals

1 Both of these men are estimable economists. Galbraith's *The Affluent Society* (Boston, 1958) is a most eloquent account of the new phenomenon described by the title. Boulding's two recent books, *The Image* (Ann Arbor, 1956) and *Principles of Economic Policy* (New Jersey, 1958), discuss all kinds of changes of mind induced by broad societal shifts. Some of the latter parallel the changes I have noted above.

for these opportunities are not already described; instead, they lie in the potential of industry to create and educational ingenuity to declare. Here lies our task as Christians who wish to witness. We must once again enter the lists as Christ's men, not to bind them to the definitions of the past but to release them to the presence of God, who is the same yesterday, today, and forever. If men are lost, it will continue to be because of their failure to repent and their strong attachment to the things of this world. It is ours to call the things of this world by such names that the name of Jesus will indeed be glorified. We can begin by asking whether law and Gospel really do this.

Luther and the Doctrine of the Holy Spirit

By Arnold E. Carlson

SOME of the more prominent among American theologians today are speaking increasingly of the significance of the Holy Spirit. Paul Tillich's Auburn Alumni lectures in 1958 are devoted to a discussion of the Spirit of God and the spirit of man. H. P. Van Dusen prods us awake by reminding us that those whose special interest is the Holy Spirit today constitute religiously "the Third Force" in Christendom.[1] George S. Hendry writes a book on *The Holy Spirit in Christian Theology*.[2] G. J. Sirks startles us by referring to the doctrine of the Holy Spirit as "the Cinderella of Theology."[3] This list could be expanded. Not for a long time has the focus of contemporary thinking centered so sharply upon the significance of the Holy Spirit. In light of this fact, we who stand in the heritage of Martin Luther may well inquire whether we have adequately plumbed the depths of his thought and his experience in this particular area. It is this task to which I would address myself in this essay.

When we wish to understand what Luther believed and taught concerning justification by faith, we go to his expositions of Romans or Galatians, or to the little tract on Christian Liberty, or to the shorter summaries in the Catechisms. When we seek to uncover what Luther believed and taught concerning the Holy Spirit our task is not quite so simple. Nowhere has he systematically summarized his teachings on this subject. The explanation of the third article in the Catechism is excellent but depends for its full doctrinal richness upon what may be garnered from other sources. In Luther's attacks upon the "heavenly prophets," he heaped bitter denunciations upon those who claimed immediate communion with the Spirit of God. This may sometimes have prompted the conclusion, even among Lutherans, that Luther was more of a binitarian than a trinitarian. The historically accepted inter-

1 H. P. Van Dusen, "The Third Force in Christendom," in *Life*, June 9, 1958, pp. 123 ff.
2 George S. Hendry, *The Holy Spirit in Christian Theology* (Philadelphia, 1956).
3 G. J. Sirks, "The Cinderella of Theology: the doctrine of the Holy Spirit," in *The Harvard Theological Review*, Vol. L, No. 2, pp. 77 ff.

pretations of Luther have placed very little emphasis upon the significance of the Holy Spirit. Frequently he has been interpreted as following strictly in the path of medieval scholasticism, which taught that the Holy Spirit is channeled to the believer exclusively through the sacramental structures of the church. If that were the case, he would have nothing new or distinctive to teach us concerning the Holy Spirit.

Regin Prenter, professor of Systematic Theology at Aarhus University, Denmark, has reached a drastically different conclusion concerning the significance of the Holy Spirit to Luther personally, and consequently for his whole theological structure. In his volume, *Spiritus Creator,*[4] Prenter goes back beyond the controversies with the Enthusiasts to establish the thesis that prior to his heated opposition to Carlstad, Müntzer, and others, Luther had carefully worked out a dynamic concept of the role that the Holy Spirit plays in the creation of faith, of how the Spirit mediates Jesus Christ to man, and how in the experience of inner conflict it is the Holy Spirit that conforms man to both the death and the resurrection of Christ. Against those who contend that Luther abandoned this dynamic view of the Holy Spirit when he saw how the Enthusiasts were claiming individual independence from both Scripture and Christ, Prenter contends that it was actually because of his own previously developed doctrine of the Holy Spirit, which had grown out of his own experience, that Luther already had a clear theological base from which to oppose their irresponsible fanaticism.

Prenter actually takes the position that in Luther's understanding of the Holy Spirit we may well find another integrating center around which the other fundamental tenets of his faith appear in the form of a constellation. From this center we may more properly understand justification by faith, Luther's doctrine of grace and *donum,* inner conflict, *simul iustus et peccator,* the theology of the cross as over against the theology of glory, and the whole concept of vocation. This appears to me to be a valid and significantly helpful approach to Luther. Prenter has given us a new appreciation of the significance of this particular doctrine; but more important, he has given us another perspective within which to view the whole structure of Lutheran theology.

4 Regin Prenter, *Spiritus Creator* (Philadelphia, 1953).

Prenter contends that in the years that have intervened since the Reformation, the work of the Holy Spirit has been falsely relegated to an aspect of sanctification and regeneration.[5] This has opened the door to a philosophical and substantial concept of God's Spirit which regards the Spirit as a divine energy that can be infused and appropriated. With the help of this "energy" man is able to produce the "fruits of the Spirit." Thus he will daily grow in grace and holiness, as he follows after the example of Jesus Christ. Prenter contends that when you do *that* to Luther's theology, you distort it by trying to compress his thought within the molds of medieval scholasticism, against which Luther himself rebelled. Luther held a much more dynamic view, which can be summarized by saying that the work of the Holy Spirit is to conform man to Christ. This is accomplished by conforming man to Christ's death and resurrection.

This whole concept of conformity to Christ must be set over against the scholastic concept of imitation of Christ. Within all types of imitation piety, as represented by Augustine and scholasticism, man remains the subject, striving toward Christlikeness. Christ himself remains the distant, exalted ideal, who represents the object of man's striving. If it is allowed that man enjoys some achievement in his strivings, you have a nice theology of progress, or outwardly measurable growth in sanctification. Luther places conformity to Christ over against this idea. He makes the Holy Spirit the active subject, working within man to conform him to Christ.

As a starting point for this conformity, Luther gives a tropological interpretation of the conception of Christ in the virgin Mary, via the Holy Spirit. By the Holy Spirit, similarly, Christ is virtually "born again" in the believer.[6] While the union with Christ, thus understood, will always remain a mystery, it should be recognized that Luther opposes this kind of conception of faith to the part played by the Holy Spirit in the thought of the mystics. Among them Luther believed that the Holy Spirit was regarded as a gift given *in consequence* of man's first having turned to God. Prenter, Vogelsang, and Bring all share the view that when the mystics talk about the Holy Spirit it is entirely on the basis of an "energy" which enables men to imitate Christ.

5 *Op. cit.*, pp. 62, 63 ff., 87 ff.

6 *Op. cit.*, p. 11. Citations in support of this conclusion are drawn WA, 56:364.35 and WA, 10, II:111.11 ff.

Luther's view may more properly be related to Paul's comment in I Cor. 12:3, "No one can say 'Jesus is Lord' except by the Holy Spirit." In short, by the activity of the Holy Spirit, faith is first conceived in man, who thus becomes a believer.

The initial, yet enduring, stage of this conformity to Christ consists of the experience of inner conflict. This is not just a matter of perfecting man's inner nature and sublimating his idealistic struggle. The most intense and ultimately inevitable form of this conflict consists of being conformed unto Christ's death. Our death and condemnation to hell are accepted as being that which we rightly deserve. In this context Luther speaks of the law as "the hammer of God" that breaks and shatters all man's self-righteousness and self-confidence before God. "That pernicious and pestilent opinion of man's own righteousness . . . suffereth not God to come to his own natural and proper work, and therefore it must be brought to naught . . . by revealing to us that we suffer from a disease for which there is no cure in ourselves. It prepares us for the remedy of the Gospel, for salvation by God himself, who can now come to his 'proper' work."[7]

When man resigns himself to this condemnation and acknowledges even his death as that which he justly deserves, then he is actually also united with him who is capable of breaking the power of hell, death, and the devil, i.e., he is conformed to Christ's death and united with him in his resurrection. To Luther, such resignation came to be evidence that the Holy Spirit is already present. He does not wait to come until man, by sufficient mortification or good works, has qualified himself for his (the Spirit's) presence. In fact, Luther asserts that it is only by the Holy Spirit's presence in us that we can turn our eyes from God's condemning law to his saving Gospel. He asserts again and again that "we can have no assurance that the promise of the Gospel is the Word of the living God *to us* unless the Holy Spirit says in our heart, 'that is God's Word.' "[8] When, through the outward preaching of the Word and the inward witness of the Holy Spirit, faith is created, that which is promised in the Gospel becomes effective for the

7 *A commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians,* by Martin Luther. Edited by Erasmus Middleton (London, 1807), pp. 209 ff., as cited by Philip Watson, *Let God be God* (Philadelphia), 1948.

8 EA, 2,13:320, as cited by Watson, *op. cit.,* p. 167.

believer. "Christ," says Luther, "enters by the Gospel through a man's ears into his heart, and dwells there."[9]

It follows, then, that according to Luther's theology, inner conflict is not to be regarded as a disease to be avoided at all costs. He fostered no "peace of mind" cult! Rather such inner conflict is the evidence that God, through his Holy Spirit, is actively struggling for man's redemption. He is stripping us of every false confidence that we may rely solely upon his divine mercy. It is God's "foreign work" preparing us for his "proper work."

Luther does not recognize any idealistic division of man into two parts, a higher and a lower nature. The philosophical dualism between matter and spirit is not to be confused with Luther's religious dualism of flesh and spirit. For Luther the contrast between flesh and spirit is a contrast between the whole man without the real presence of God, and the whole man within and under his real presence; or, it is the contrast of the total man under God's wrath as over against the total man within the sphere of God's grace. There is, therefore, no real affinity between the spiritual nature of man and the Spirit of God. Our spirits, i.e., our wills, our reason, etc., cannot conform to God's will and purpose unless they first be put to death. To accept this is in reality self-hatred rather than self-love. God's gift of his Holy Spirit is, therefore, evidenced as much in the death of the old man as in the life of the new man. This certainly represents a sharp break with much of what we currently identify as "liberal Protestant theology."

The understanding of the Holy Spirit's work that we have here been presenting is particularly significant in Luther's "theology of the cross." In scholasticism's "theology of glory," the relationship between man and God posits God as a fixed point, and man is eternally striving to move upward toward this point. In Luther, God is not remote—except in his wrath, apart from Christ. Even in his wrath God is remote only as the father who is separated from his estranged son, even though they may be seated beside each other at the same table. In Christ, however, where we meet God in all his graciousness, God is really and personally present. And he is present in Christ *in* the believer. This is not with some special affinity with man at his best, as is the case in either scholasticism or mysticism, but coming only to man at his very lowest

9 WA, 10, I:48.16 ff., cf. 619.17 ff.

point, in the inner conflict of despair and resignation unto death before God who is justly offended at man's sin. Luther no longer thinks of the Holy Spirit in terms of the scholastic tradition as a transcendent cause of a new (supernatural) nature in man, infusing grace as a divine energy. Instead, the Holy Spirit is proclaimed as the real presence of God. God himself, as the Spirit, is really present in the groaning of the anxious and tempted soul held in the grip of death and hell. In the midst of such inner conflict, Luther himself drew much comfort from Rom. 8:26, ". . . the Spirit himself intercedes for us with sighs too deep for words." Thus it is the Holy Spirit who comes to intercede with unutterable groanings, who conquers the accusations of God's law. Thus, *in us, here and now,* God is living and struggling on our behalf in the very midst of our damnation and death. *Fellowship with God occurs on the level of the sinner!*

In this manner the death of Christ becomes not only a historical fact but an experienced reality in the life of the believer. We are "being conformed unto his death." This is the work of the Holy Spirit. It is he who takes Christ out of the remoteness of history and transcendent heavenly glory and places him in the midst of our own life with its suffering, inner conflict, and death.

As a consequence of this analysis of the work of the Holy Spirit, according to Luther, we now make a second assertion: The Holy Spirit mediates the living and resurrected Christ to the believer in such a way that Christ becomes the new subject of the believer's life. Here the contrast between imitation and conformity is most marked.

In imitation piety the believer is related to Christ as an ideal. Christ is an example. He represents a way to be followed. He is outside of us. The believer is himself the active one who exercises his own volition in choosing to follow Christ. In conformity, by contrast, the living, present Christ unseats man's self-dominion, so that the believer not only can but *must* say with St. Paul, "I have been crucified with Christ; it is no longer I who live, but Christ who lives in me." This activity of Christ within the believer as the new subject is, according to Luther, the direct result of the Holy Spirit's activity. The phrase, "faith in Christ," indicates the medium in and by which the Holy Spirit does this destroying and creating work. By this Luther is reminding us that "We were buried therefore with him by baptism into death, so that as Christ was raised from the dead by the glory of the Father, we

too might walk in newness of life."[10] In his own words Luther can say: "He dwells in our hearts by such faith and purifies us daily by his own proper work. This means that the believer, who is united with Christ even more closely than the husband is coupled with his wife, must naturally share in Christ's conflict and victory. For the marriage of the believing soul to Christ is a matter not only of communion but of blessed strife and victory and salvation and redemption."[11] "Risen and ascended though Christ is, 'he sitteth not idly in heaven, but is present with us, working and living in us, and his life and work are no theoretical or abstract notions, but a matter of his true and substantial presence.' Hence, what was done once historically is always done spiritually in every Christian."[12]

This makes inescapable the conclusion that faith in Christ is a real union with the living Christ as a redeeming reality. This is the basis for the often quoted expression about the happy exchange between Christ and the believer.[13] In this faith-fellowship we have the necessary basis for the fact that the righteousness of Christ is truly reckoned unto us and our sin is truly reckoned unto Christ. Another way of expressing the dynamic character of this position is to say that it is not Christ's merits that are attributed to me, but it is Christ himself who is mediated to me, who now actually takes over, who now has a new body—which is also mine.

So we have contended that the Holy Spirit so mediates the resurrected and living Christ to men that he becomes the living subject of their lives. This is another way of saying that the terms "faith in Christ" and "conformity to Christ" have the same meaning. All conformity to Christ which is not identical with faith in Christ is imitation.[14] Or, to put this in other and Pauline language, faith is the gift of God. "No man can say 'Jesus is Lord' except in the Holy Spirit."[15] But where the Holy Spirit creates faith, which is God's gift, there the believer's life is "hid with Christ in God."[16] The believer can say in all humility and honesty, "It is no longer I who live, but Christ who lives

10 Rom. 6:4, RSV.
11 WA, 10, I:160.22 ff.
12 Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 167.
13 *W.M.L.* (Holman ed.), II, 321 ff.
14 Prenter, *op. cit.*, p. 50.
15 I Cor. 12:3
16 *Col.* 3:3.

in me."[17] This argument may be summarized by saying that God alone makes faith in Christ possible through the gift of his Holy Spirit, who mediates Christ to the believer as a living, personal presence, whom the believer acknowledges as his Lord, i.e., the new subject of his life.

In our own immediate heritage as Lutherans there is a danger in this understanding of Luther's theology which I wish to spell out more explicitly. In the literature of Lutheran Orthodoxy, the idea of the real presence of Christ, i.e., the indwelling Christ, and the doctrine of justification by faith have been construed as two separate and distinct emphases. The latter theme has carried its own separate and significant description, namely, "justification." The former has been treated as "sanctification." One is our religious interest; the other is our ethical interest. It is Prenter's contention that in Luther these two ideas were always kept together as a complete unity. The place at which they are united is in Luther's dynamic understanding of the Holy Spirit. This does not mean that the two terms do not have distinctive meanings. They are not to be used interchangeably, but they are to be kept together. That the Holy Spirit is the very foundation for all thought about *sanctification* has been readily admitted in Lutheran theology. What has been less evident, and what I have tried to indicate in this essay, is that it is equally impossible adequately to grasp Luther's understanding of *justification* apart from what he believed and thought about the Holy Spirit.

We have suggested that in reality Rom. 8:26 may have been as significant to Luther as was Rom. 1:17. It is the Holy Spirit who creates the inner conflict whereby every vestige of self-righteousness and merit is stripped from us, so that we are conformed to Christ's death. It is the Holy Spirit who mediates Christ to us, so that we stand with him in his righteousness, in the sphere of God's grace rather than under God's wrath. It is the Holy Spirit who brings this living and resurrected Christ to us, prepares us to receive him, dethrones us as the sovereigns of our lives, and enthrones Christ as the "greater than the world, who is within us."[18] It is the Holy Spirit who prolongs the inner conflict, so that we never traverse beyond our constant need for God's forgiving mercy—and the old Adam must be drowned "by daily

17 Gal. 2:20.
18 I John 4:19.

sorrow and repentance."[19] Luther says that "it is the Holy Spirit who has ever to continue his work in us through the Word, and daily to dispense forgiveness, until we attain to that life where there will be no more forgiveness but only pure and holy people."[20]

The dynamic concept of the indwelling Christ, mediated by the Holy Spirit, has not received very much attention in much of Lutheran theology. The reason for this silence is probably the fear that such a doctrine can easily degenerate into a kind of Christ-mysticism, which would smack either of a Greek substantial union of man's spirit with the Holy Spirit, or would become a kind of psychological mysticism, which makes the reality of the living Christ's presence in the believer dependent upon certain feeling states. No one would dare to minimize these dangers. Luther also feared them. He sought to safeguard the concept of the indwelling Christ, however, by insisting that this reality is ever completely bound to faith in God's Word which promises that this shall be so. The reality of this conformity to Christ as the new subject in the believer's life must ever be delivered from dependence upon outward evidences. Faith for Luther is always a strenuous affair, a "conviction of things not seen."[21] He argues that even though Christ's presence in the believer is not outwardly apparent, it is nevertheless real and valid because it is promised in the Word of God.

In his later controversy with the Enthusiasts, two further safeguards concerning Luther's understanding of the Holy Spirit become clearly evident. The first is that the Holy Spirit is always understood as the Spirit of Christ. Prenter asserts that Luther "knows of no influence of the Spirit which is not Christ-centered. The Spirit always works by making Christ present."[22] The second safeguard, which is actually a corollary of the first, is that for Luther the Holy Spirit's work is never to be construed apart from Word and sacrament. These are God-appointed means by which the Spirit works, and it is not within the prerogatives of man to dispense with them. In a classic bit

19 Luther's Small Catechism, in *Book of Concord,* edited by H. E. Jacobs (Philadelphia, 1911), p. 371.

20 Luther's Large Catechism, in *Book of Concord,* p. 446.

21 Heb. 11:1.

22 Prenter, *op. cit.,* p. 52. Claude Welch, in a very excellent article, reminds us that this is the essential meaning of the *filioque* clause in the Nicene Creed. "The doctrine of *filioque* stands at the outset for precisely that which distinguishes the Christian conception of the Holy Spirit from all other notions of spirit, that is, the assertion that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of Christ." *Theology Today,* Vol. VIII, p. 29.

of irony Luther quotes the Enthusiasts as saying: "'Spirit! Spirit! The Spirit must do it! The letter killeth!' Thus Münzer called us Wittenberg theologians 'men learned in the Scriptures,' and himself 'the man taught by the Spirit'; and many others followed his example. There you see how the devil had armed himself and built up his barricade."[23]

We are led to draw this conclusion: In terms of his previously developed theology of the Holy Spirit, Luther's opposition to the Enthusiasts stemmed from his conviction that one cannot separate the Holy Spirit from the Word of God, from Christ, or from the sacraments. In varying degrees the Enthusiasts were guilty of all three offenses. To desire God's gift of the Holy Spirit apart from the gift of God's Son is always to go astray, and in the end to be dominated by some spirit other than the Holy Spirit. The theological position which we have here presented, in the words of Prenter, "stands in sharp contrast to any merely forensic idea of justification in which Christ is simply the ideological content of the doctrine of objective satisfaction with its legal demand of acceptance by faith."[24] Neither does it fit into any theological formula about mystical union, which degenerates either into metaphysical assertions about "the divine in man," such as are sometimes found in Quaker theology, or into any completely subjective experience of ecstatic union with deity, which blurs the distinctions between the spirit of man and the Holy Spirit, such as is often found in the myriad forms of Pentecostalism.

To complete this theology of the Holy Spirit, something further needs to be said about the relationship of the preceding discussion to our understanding of sanctification. Here, too, the concept of "imitation" has long been accepted. It is assumed that "the fruits of the Spirit" represent a definable ideal toward which one may strive or which the believer is expected to demonstrate. Sometimes these are described as an autobiography of Christ, which is again held up as the ideal for the Christian life. The question, "What would Jesus do?" is held to be normative, and presumably is to be answered on the basis of what Jesus did. This again dismisses the dynamic character of the indwelling Christ. It is still man who acts, wills, plans, chooses, strives toward the external ideal.

23 *W.M.L.*, V, p. 292.
24 Prenter, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

In contrast to such a view, Luther advances a realistic appreciation of what St. Paul means in Gal. 2:20, "It is no longer I who live, but Christ who lives in me." He suggests that in this life "in the Spirit" we are constantly moving from the state of faith, which grasps nothing else than the promise and alien righteousness of Christ, out into the activity of faith. Here the new man struggles to function as the instrument of the living Christ. The man of the flesh, the old man, may frustrate the new man. To the extent that this happens, to that extent inner conflict and self-condemnation are continued, and the believer is thrown back again and again upon the alien righteousness of Christ. Thus is conceived this double movement: in to Christ—out to the neighbor. These belong to one and the same spiritual totality. One is justification, the other is sanctification; but both are the work of the Holy Spirit.

This means that the new life is not something infused by the Holy Spirit. It is rather that Jesus Christ himself has been mediated to us by the Holy Spirit. Thus the connection between faith and love is only a reality in the living and present Christ. By his resurrection he is now free to be truly present with us and in us, and to function as the active subject in love's work for the neighbor. So Luther's understanding of faith carries with it the necessary counterpart of faith active in love.[25] It is by no means a foregone conclusion, however, that the Christ-directed acts of love today will be carbon-copies of his acts as recorded in the New Testament. If Christ's life was then lived in a creative and flexible response to the needs of men, it is reasonable to believe that it will be so still.

Those who have concluded that Luther's theology is lacking in ethical content thereby betray a lack of understanding of the dynamic character of his faith. It would be as logical to argue that Christ did no good works in the course of his earthly ministry as it would be to argue that the living, resurrected Christ, who now dwells by faith in each believer seeking ever to conform the believer to himself, would be indifferent toward human need, so that he would now fail to respond in deeds of love. This is the essence of Luther's argument in the familiar tract on Christian Liberty, that the man who is set free from the

25 The argument advanced in this paragraph is essentially the argument Luther advances in his *Treatise on Christian Liberty*, W.M.L. II, especially pages 335-338.

necessity of saving himself is henceforth free to allow his life to be governed by Christ in response to his neighbor's needs. In this connection Luther dared to say that we should be "little Christs" to our neighbor.

This essay began with Prenter's assertion that in understanding Luther's theology the Holy Spirit represents an often neglected aspect that is capable of actually becoming another integrating center for his theological structure. If the intervening arguments are judged to be valid, then this represents an area for theological inquiry which holds promise of breaking the formal and sharp cleavage that has too long prevailed between justification and sanctification. It likewise represents an emphasis which holds promise of counteracting the charge that Lutheran theology is ethically indifferent.

Dancing and the Church

By Herta Pauly

RECENT news items reveal doubt in some parts of the church concerning the appropriateness of social dancing, be it on church property or on the campus of church-affiliated colleges. These two issues should be considered separately, though they refer back to the same fundamental principles.

I

Whether or not dancing is appropriate *in church buildings and on church property* depends on our conception of the church and the extent of its domain. In a strict sense, the church has nothing to do with recreational activities. In so far as we have adopted these, nevertheless, we have aligned ourselves more for pragmatic than confessional reasons with practices established by the "community churches," if the term may stand for an orientation rather than a specific church. We have defended this practice loosely by classing it as a "service" or argue that "fellowship" programs draw people to or remind them of the church.

However, the sponsoring of recreational activities has also been defended theologically. We deny the distinction between a sacred and a profane sphere of life. Since the consecrated life comprises all our doings, those public activities which are good enough outside the church are good enough inside the church. Therefore, if bowling and games are acceptable elsewhere, they are acceptable on church property.

This reasoning is valid in so far as it refers to the *intrinsic worth* of a proposed activity. But the principle of intrinsic worth has to be seen in conjunction with another one, that of vocation. In the issue at hand the latter means that there is a delineation of functions between the various institutions in society. How these two principles are related to each other can be seen clearly, without a detailed theological analysis, through a simple illustration: When Luther declared that the woman who bent over her wash-tub is doing as Christian a service as the pastor

in the pulpit, he did not mean to imply that clothes should be washed in church or that we should establish Christian laundries on church property.

If the unity of the two spheres in Christian living meant that every activity is the office of the church, there would be no telling where the domain of the church ends; it would end nowhere. The domain of Christians, as Christians, is, in fact, unending; but this should be distinguished from the domain of the church as church.

One further reason for sponsoring recreational activities in churches is the circumstance that communities often do not provide adequate facilities and programs for wholesome leisure-time occupation and that the church must assume responsibility here to keep the young people from patronizing places of questionable worth. This is a weighty argument, not to be ignored. Perhaps it is the crucial argument. Still, we should consider if the church should not use its influence toward the organization of civic community centers rather than make recreational programs its proper and permanent function.

Since the church has opened its gates to recreational activities, we have tried to sort out the fitting from the unfitting ones, and in that sifting process dancing has in the eyes of many been found undesirable.

Two branches of the Lutheran Church in this country have frankly stated their opposition to dancing. For purposes of documentation we must refer to these, though it is no secret that an apprehensiveness about dancing is more widely spread than are written records on it. Nor is branding our purpose. Our interest lies in an analysis and appraisal of the issue as such.

The Missouri Lutheran Church (as represented by the Concordia College conference) at a recent meeting in Milwaukee took some, though heavily guarded, steps toward admitting social dancing. It has not changed its position in principle, however.[1] Similarly, to judge from a statement of the Augustana Lutheran Church which refers to dancing in church and on campus,[2] to the mind of those who went on record in the statement, dancing seems to fall into a category together with drinking, smoking, and bingo, which is to say that dancing is thought

1 Reported in *Time*, January 26, 1959, p. 63.

2 *Social Pronouncements of the Augustana Lutheran Church and Its Conferences*, 1937-56, "Dancing," pp. 6-9.

of as a mild form of vice, or invitation to vice ("make no provision for the flesh"). The concessions made in the "precepts" (p. 9) seem to mean: "If you do not have the courage to resist the trend of secular infiltration of sacred grounds and timid hearts, supervise the dances carefully. Criteria for censorship are not stated, for once the gates have been opened to an unfortunate activity, laying down rules would be to differentiate between more or less offense, without ever reaching up to positive values. Watchers at dances might as well go by their on-the-spot judgment.

II

Why has dancing been singled out as an intrinsically bad activity? We see people misbehave in many ways while they dance, talk, or have coffee in church, out of church, before and after church. But we do not think of prohibiting talking, the consumption of coffee, and many other social practices. There clearly exists a special apprehensiveness about dancing. I believe that this apprehensiveness can be diagnosed quite clearly and can be cured.

It implies a religious taboo against the enjoyment of bodily activity for other than useful (practical) purposes. In this it derives from Puritanism, but it also has extra-Christian roots. In the far background there linger reminiscences of archaic times when dancing was an orgiastic activity; but from more recent (relatively speaking) times we still carry in our spiritual plasma the recessive genes of the Hellenic fear that spirit and mind are dragged down by the body and that where there is less body there is more spirit. In addition to this deceptive and non-Christian image of the relationship between body and spirit, the Greek conception lingers on that the body is the source of sin. Though Christians confess explicitly that the source of sin is to be found in a spirit divided against itself and that such perversion of the spirit will indeed also "drag down the body," implicitly Christians hope to "conquer sin" by radical measures about the body and then cite Rom. 13:14 as the justifying formula for their short-cut: "make no provisions for the flesh."

Since the cited statements of Lutherans are fashioned out of an entirely negative view of the matter, I want to broaden the field of vision by pointing out some of the positive aspects of social dancing so

that, having looked at both sides of the picture, churches may revise their point of view and subsequently their practical advice to schools and colleges.

In the following paragraphs, then, I am referring to dancing as a recreational activity in *church-related schools and colleges.*

Social dancing is an *activity.* This distinguishes it favorably from many other forms of entertainment in which only one or a few perform while the majority merely watches. Too much of modern recreational activity is only passive, physically and mentally. We watch others practice athletics, see movies, watch TV, listen to a guide at a gallery or the lecture of an expert instead of playing a musical instrument, making things ourselves. We are consumers, though educationally and psychologically it is healthier and more enjoyable to be the producer sometimes. At least during recreational hours it is good to handle an instrument, have an immediate experience of materials or of our own body. Dancing is one activity which can fill this void. One can dance quite well without being a professional.

Dancing is a form of communication which is in many ways preferable to other forms of social pastime; playing games, usually too childish for college-age people and experienced by many as merely a make-shift or as an ice-breaker, fails to serve as a vehicle of personal communication. Dancing is also a good alternate activity to "making conversation" or its opposite, talking shop, heavy problem discussion for lack of other topics coming to mind. Dancing, as part of an evening's program, can be a genuine relief from the extreme of heavy conversation and random "filler" talk.

Dancing is not merely activity. It is formal, at least formed, activity. In addition to physical action and skill, which it shares with athletic games, dancing develops rhythmic control, gracefulness, and a sense for form and style. In being at once a physical and mental, because an aesthetic, activity, dancing brings out not "the flesh" but the humanity of the dancers.

Social dancing is an activity of men and women, brought together specifically as men and women—as they should. Here they encounter each other in a special, determined mode of behavior, in a dance pattern in which each partner assumes his defined role. Social dancing is an aesthetic dramatization of the dynamics of human relations, and particularly those of the sexes (that is, of men and women), without,

however, singling out "sex" in its narrow sense. In patterned and expressive forms the partners experience playfulness, seriousness, leading and responding, sympathy and antagonism, teasing, suspense, challenge, acceptance, rejection, and the discipline of moving in unison for the skillful performance of formally precise movement patterns.

Church pronouncements have often stressed the dangers of physical contact in dancing. We must bring out the other side, namely, that concentration on the skillful and graceful execution of a dance, and the love of dancing, is actually a sublimation of sexual qualities, not their indulgence. Dancing does not break down the desirable restraints, though it may help in relaxing undesirable inhibitions in relation to the opposite sex. Dancing is as "mental" as it is "physical." As such it is sex-related but not sex-centered. But if we in our minds identify dancing with sex (perhaps because we have not danced enough to know), we are likely to implant this conception in the minds of those we mean to educate.

Social dancing should be thought of as one among the many forms of leisure-time activity. Whether the occasion is "a dance" or a social gathering with incidental dancing, it should take place in an atmosphere which accentuates the social, festive, and cheerful character of the occasion and which makes apparent the fact that this is a social function, that is, a public function where good manners count because we are almost "on stage." An evening of dancing, therefore, should never be scheduled in a locality which could suggest to the students that it was chosen because dancing is not good enough to be done on campus. If an off-campus locale is rented for no other reason than that dancing is considered third-rate entertainment, this will invite the attitude: Since it is considered third-rate, they expect us to perform third-rate; let us take the opportunity.

Much misbehavior at social occasions, with or without dancing, is due to the fact that young people have had little social training and are so unaccustomed to using their imagination while at a party that they cover up for their blank spots and sense of awkwardness by doing the next best or next worst thing. Since this is the case with older people, too, if caught in a situation they do not know how to handle, this seems to have little or nothing to do with dancing. It is futile to use dancing as a scape-goat. Social dancing can help young people a great deal in getting used to formal as well as informal social respon-

siveness, in gaining self-confidence and poise, and in becoming participants when they are inclined to be shy observers at a party.

III

Dancing has held its ground through the ages as a social activity. It has always enhanced the festive and cheerful mood which recreational hours should provide. In earlier times there existed a rather clear distinction between courtly dance and folk dancing, the former more or less the dance form of the aristocracy, the latter that of the peasantry and the lower strata of the population. During the past 150 years or so, these distinctions have disappeared. Everybody dances the same dances. Aside from this "democratic" aspect, which we welcome, a negative side must also be noted in this respect. When courtly ceremony set the tone, dance forms were kept within limits of good taste and good manners. With the vanishing of aristocratic taste as the style-setter, social dance forms have not been evolved by those who command the surest tastes. Those who are setting the pattern now often adapt dance forms for our use which are not expressive of our true character as Christians or members of this cultural realm. Without having to return to courtly dance forms, the churches as well as others who are in positions of leadership in our culture should assert their tastes in the adoption or rejection of the dance forms which fads and fashions blow our way from season to season. Such restoration of beauty and good form to social dancing will, however, have to come primarily from those who dance and not from those who do not. The problem will not be resolved by prohibiting dancing. In order to reform, we first have to affirm dancing in principle and then try to reform it from within.

In this respect, colleges should lead. They can lead through their faculties of art and aesthetics. While social dancing cannot be counted as a college subject, the matter can be approached indirectly. Colleges should offer courses in the modern dance (to be distinguished from "social dancing," about which we are primarily speaking here). The modern dance is dance as an art form. It is body-building as well as contributory to cultivating good taste and an adequate attitude toward the body. As such it has a real place in liberal arts education.

In sum, then, our attitude toward dancing must change focus:

We should not veto social dancing as recreational activity in schools and colleges, but should exert our influence in challenging bad taste in contemporary social dance forms. If we do this we shall find that we have many allies both inside and outside the church. Though the church should not automatically adapt itself to the cultural setting in which it exists, the church should always clarify its real mission in a given cultural setting and issue and then ally itself with those forces inside and outside its fold which concur with its objectives. Dancing is one such issue today.

The Doctrine of God in Deutero-Isaiah

By Benjamin Bedenbaugh

If there is at least as much truth as there is poetry in the picture of the twentieth century as a spiritual kindergarten in which millions of bewildered infants are attempting to spell "God" with the wrong blocks, we have perhaps a special reason to watch "the evangelist of the Old Testament"[1] as he puts the blocks together for us. The phrase "doctrine of God" should not be taken to mean a logically conceived, philosophically wrought abstraction such as philosophical theologians are wont to construct. As H. Wheeler Robinson[2] pointed out shortly after the turn of the century and G. Ernest Wright,[3] among others, has recently reiterated, the God of Israel is an active person whose deeds are the index to his ontological makeup. At every point Deutero-Isaiah is concerned with a God who acts and whose nature is seen in what he does.

1. *Yahweh is the only God* (43:11; 44:6-8; 45:5, 21, 22; 46:9).[4] Almost like a refrain comes the repeated assertion that Israel's God is the only God and there is none other. Where this is not explicitly stated, it is assumed. It is probably not going too far to say that it was our prophet who confronted Israel with the first radical monotheism. Functions that had been assigned to other deities, like the fertility of the soil and the productivity of nature (Hos. 2:8), had gradually been seen to be the real function of Yahweh; but Deutero-Isaiah takes the final leap and declares that these beings are not only inactive but non-existent.

2. *Yahweh, the only God, will brook no rivals, either in the forces that men imagine to have control over their destinies or in the images which erect and worship* (40:18-20; 44:9-20; 45:20; 46:1-7). For Deutero-Isaiah the worship of idols is the folly of follies, and with sheer sarcasm he extols their nothingness and the tomfoolery of those who make and worship them. The makers of idols are only men, creatures making for themselves objects of worship, when they could be bowing the knee to him who created both them and the stuff of their images. The idol is nothing but wood from a tree that grows in the forest—the same substance that a man throws on the fire to warm himself. Rather than providing an undergirding power for the lives of their worshipers, idols must be carried about. Instead of

1 See C. R. North, *Isaiah 40-55, Introduction and Commentary* (Torch Bible Commentary), p. 28.

2 *Religious Ideas of the Old Testament,* p. 51.

3 *God Who Acts* (Studies in Biblical Theology, No. 8). Cf. Otto J. Baab, *The Theology of the Old Testament,* pp. 24 ff.; Harrell F. Beck, *Monotheism in Akh-en-aton and the Second Isaiah* (unpublished doctoral dissertation in the library of Boston University Graduate School), p. 366.

4 The list of references given after each main point is intended to be suggestive, not exhaustive.

earing, they must be borne.[5] Aside from the folly of idolatry to common sense, it abominable to the jealous Yahweh:

> Behold, I have refined you, but not like silver;
> I have tried you in the furnace of affliction.
> For my own sake, for my own sake, I do it,
> for how should my name be profaned?
> My glory I will not give to another (48:10, 11).

3. *Yahweh is Sovereign Creator* (40:26, 28; 44:24-28; 45:9-13; 45:18). Deutero-Isaiah uses *bara'*, the highly significant term for God's creative activity, more frequently than any other writer in the Old Testament. The claims that Yahweh makes upon Israel stem from the fact that the people of Israel owe their very existence to him; it was he who constituted them a nation. As their Creator and Lord he has power over them. This is not some arbitrarily derived power. Yahweh's sovereignty is based on his own moral greatness.

> Only in the Lord, it shall be said of me
> are righteousness and strength:
> to him shall come and be ashamed
> all who were incensed against him.
> In the Lord all the offspring of Israel
> shall triumph and glory (45:24, 25).

For Israel to question the ways of Yahweh would be like a piece of pottery quizzing the potter about his intentions or a baby in the process of delivery making inquiry of his travailing mother. Here is a reverberation of Jeremiah's parable of the potter and the clay and one of the points at which our prophet becomes a "Deutero-Jeremiah."[6]

4. *Yahweh is holy* (40:12-17, 21-27; 55:8, 9). I am using the term, as I believe Deutero-Isaiah used it, without any specifically ethical emphasis, to describe the separateness, the transcendence, the "godness" of God. The prophet maintains an absolute line of demarcation between Yahweh, the Creator, and man and the universe, the created. Two centuries before, Hosea (11:96) had made the same point, but not so emphatically, for in his view "transcendence" and "immanence" are held together. Before the God of Deutero-Isaiah all the nations are less than nothing. This idea may be repugnant to the human mind, but what of the human mind!

> For my thoughts are not your thoughts,
> neither are your ways my ways,
> says the Lord.
> For as the heavens are higher than the earth,
> so are my ways higher than your ways
> and my thoughts than your thoughts (55:8, 9).

Things in the natural order are ephemeral; Yahweh is eternal.

5 This happy phrase is suggested by G. A. Smith in *The Book of Isaiah,* Vol. II, pp. 193 ff.
6 I believe the phrase is George Adam Smith's, though I cannot trace the reference.

5. *Yahweh is righteous* (41:26; 42:21; 45:8, 13, 19-25; 46:13; 51:5, 6). A study of these passages will show that the idea of righteousness is not reserved in Deutero-Isaiah exclusively for God's covenant with Israel. The term is rather more inclusive. It includes by definition and overtone an absolute quality of Yahweh's deity, straightforwardness, good faith, purposefulness, conformity to a norm, effectiveness and power to prevail, reasonableness, rational and moral consistency, strength, vindication.[7] Our prophet, in contrast with some modern dogmatics, does not set the righteousness of God over against his mercy. He does not make Yahweh a Saviour in spite of his righteousness, but rather "a righteous God and *therefore* a Saviour."[8] In this connection Paul is his spiritual son (Rom. 1:17).

6. *Yahweh is all-powerful* (40:10, 26). His power shows itself in his creation, the kingship which he exercises over his creation, his salvation of his people, his control over nature, and the control of human history. He challenges other deities to show any knowledge of what is to come (41:21-24). This he does not in order to prove power as a seer and predicter, but to show that the other would-be deities have no knowledge of what is to come because they have no controlling influence over human affairs. He had not abdicated this power in the Babylonian exile. It was he who gave up Jacob to the spoiler, and Israel to the robbers (42:24a). He shows his power against evil, even the evil of Israel. He can direct the history of other nations, too, and use Cyrus as his "shepherd" (44:28), "his anointed" (45:1). And what came to be regarded as most significant of all, Yahweh was active in the Egyptian bondage and the Exodus. He is the protagonist in the drama of human history.

The importance of the aforementioned motifs in Deutero-Isaiah's understanding of the nature of deity is pointed up by such a collocation of passages as George Adam Smith has arranged:[9]

> I, I Yahweh, and none beside Me a Saviour. I am God—El. Also from today on I am He. I will work, and who shall let it? I, I am He who blots out thy transgressions. I First, and I Last; beside Me there is no God—Elohim. Is there a God, Eloah, beside Me? yea, there is no Rock; I know not any. I Yahweh, Maker of all things. I am Yahweh, and there is none else; beside Me no God. Former of light and Creator of darkness, Maker of weal and Creator of bale; God-Righteous, El Saddik, and a Saviour: there is none except Me. Face Me, and be saved all ends of the earth; for I am God, El, and there is none else. Only in Yahweh—of Me shall they say—are righteousness and strength. I am God, El, and there is none else; God, Elohim, and there is none like Me. I am He; I am First, yea, I am Last. I, I have spoken. I have declared it.

7. *Yahweh is a covenant God* (42:5-9; 55:3-5). Like Jeremiah, Deutero-Isaiah knew that God's purpose was essentially creative; his design was to establish. Our prophet never essays to tell us why the covenant should have been made with Israel, but he is concerned that Israel not forget her covenant status with Yahweh. In making the covenant with Israel the Creator Yahweh, "who created

7 For this catalogue I am in the debt of G. A. Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 241 ff.
8 A. B. Davidson, *Theology of the Old Testament*, p. 144.
9 *Op. cit.*, pp. 156, 157.

the heavens and stretched them out, who spread forth the earth and what comes from it" (42:5a), had gone a step farther and had constituted Israel a people. He had glorified her and set her as a light to the nations. Israel's role was to be faithful to the God who made the covenant and to his purpose in entering into special relationship with her.

8. *Yahweh is God hidden and revealed* (45:15, 19). Though our prophet does not hammer this point as much as he does some others, the idea of Yahweh as *Deus absconditus et revelatus* is in his mind and may be part of the answer to the problem of Israel's election.

> Truly, thou art a God who hidest thyself,
> O God of Israel, the Savior.
> I did not speak in secret,
> in a land of darkness;
> I did not say to the offspring of Jacob,
> "Seek me in chaos."
> I the Lord speak the truth,
> I declare what is right (45:15, 19).

He has made known to Israel his purpose for her and she knows what mission he intends for her to carry out, but he has not made clear why Israel should be the nation chosen for his covenant.

9. *Yahweh destines Israel to be his witness* (40:9; 42:6; 43:12; 44:8; 49:6). Israel's role as chosen people is not a preferential status arbitrarily conferred on her for her own self-aggrandizement. Her business is to be a light to the nations. The banner which she is to carry is "Behold your God!"—not behold specially favored Israel who causes her sister nations to view her with jealousy because of her special glorification, but behold Yahweh, the Lord of heaven and earth. "I will give you as a light to the nations, that my salvation may reach to the end of the earth" (49:6b; cf. 42:6). J. Wellhausen's paraphrase of the Moslem creed is quite pertinent: "There is no God but God, and Israel is his prophet."[10]

10. *Yahweh loves Israel and will help and restore her* (41:8-16; 43:1-7, 14; 49:22-26; 51:3-8; 52:11, 12). The reason for this love is not to be found in the appealing features of Israel, but in Yahweh's own nature: "Every one who is called by my name, whom I created for my glory, whom I formed and made" (43:7; cf. 49:23b). The God of loving providence (*provide*-ence) has not forgotten his people. In his long-suffering patience he bears with them and promises them his power for their restoration. He will reverse the victory of the Babylonians and vindicate Israel. The presence of Yahweh is promised to Israel to go before her and follow her as her rear guard (52:12b).

11. *Those whom Yahweh makes his messengers can never ultimately fail because of the power that attends the Word of Yahweh* (40:5, 8; 45:23; 55:10, 11). Unlike tangible objects in God's world, his word is eternal, and there is a power

10 Quoted in Robert H. Pfeiffer, *Introduction to the Old Testament*, p. 474.

that goes with it which produces the results that God chooses. This power is the power of Yahweh himself who "setteth up and brings to naught."

12. *The worship of Yahweh is intended for all nations* (40:5; 45:14; 52:10; 54:5). Universalism is the inevitable corollary of monotheism. If there is but one God and he is Creator and Sustainer of the universe, all peoples must bow the knee to him. Yahweh's purpose in glorifying Israel was that Israel might lead others to the knowledge of the true God and what he requires of his creatures. He who is the guiding power in the life of the nations will show his salvation to all mankind. This he will do supremely through his Suffering Servant.

13. *The Suffering Servant of Yahweh is the means by which his final purposes of salvation will be realized* (42:1-4; 49:1-6; 52:13-53:12). It is wholly outside the province of this paper to inquire whether this Suffering Servant is Israel or the prophet himself or some other historical character in pre-New Testament times or Jesus Christ or no historic person(s) at all or some combination of these possibilities. The Servant Songs make it clear that the Servant is the instrument of the purposes of Yahweh and that the experience of the Servant involves suffering which has beneficial effects in the lives of others.

Such in broad outline is the nature of the God whom the Second Isaiah served. We cannot complete this survey of some of his leading ideas without registering a sense of gratitude for this nameless prophet who more than any other messenger of Yahweh in Old Testament times helped to sensitize the minds of first century Jews and Gentiles for the mission of him in whose will is our peace.[11]

11 Cf. C. B. Hedrick: The New Testament term "gospel" owes its origin and its distinctive connotations to Second Isaiah (paraphrased in Fleming James, *Personalities of the Old Testament,* p. 376); Fleming James: "To us the Servant Songs . . . seem the deepest place in the Old Testament" (*ibid.,* p. 389); W. O. E. Oesterley and T. H. Robinson: The Second Isaiah's conception of God is "the most exalted teaching in the whole of the Old Testament" (*An Introduction to the Books of the Old Testament,* p. 273).

H. H. Rowley's Old Testament Theology*

By Victor R. Gold

FROM the prolific pen of H. H. Rowley of Victoria University, Manchester, England, has come another extremely useful book. This time it is an introduction to the theology of the Old Testament, the seven chapters of which formed the 1955 Sprunt Lectures at Union Theological Seminary, Richmond, Virginia. After an introduction in which he discusses the relationship between various aspects of Old Testament study and Old Testament theology and the principles governing the selection of materials, he discusses the faith of Israel under the following headings: Revelation and its Media, The Nature of God, The Nature and Need of Man, Individual and Community, The Good Life, Death and Beyond, and The Day of the Lord. The book concludes with three helpful indices: subjects, authors and scripture texts.

In his excellent first chapter, "Revelation and its Media," Rowley surveys the means by which God revealed himself to man. These means include the observation of nature, divination, dreams, chance experience, life of the community, the written word, the personality of the king, priest and prophet, and especially the blend of personality (prophetic) and event "in certain moments of special significance in the biblical story,"[1] citing as examples the deliverance from Egypt under Moses, the deliverance from Canaanites under Deborah, and from Sennacherib during Hezekiah's reign with the figure of Isaiah as dominant.

In his discussion of the media of revelation, Rowley rightly notes that the written word is only one means of revelation and, so far as biblical revelation is concerned (as well as elsewhere), not even the most important. His treatment of the Israelite priesthood is one more contribution toward the "rehabilitation of the priesthood" which can be noted among students of the Old Testament today. The positive importance of the priesthood for the preservation and development of Israel's religion has been overlooked far too frequently in the past.

Rowley exercises proper caution in his discussion of ecstasy in Israelite prophecy. Among the prophets we find a blend of the "ecstatic" and divinatory with a unique religious orientation. He presents a good discussion of the difference between Israel's prophets and the prophets among other religions.[2] He ably defends the historicity of Moses from the text itself without the aid of archaeology. This is an important item, since archaeology has done much to restore Moses to the

*An analytical and critical review of H. H. Rowley, *The Faith of Israel* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1956. 220 pages. $3.50).

1 H. H. Rowley, *The Faith of Israel* (Philadelphia, 1956), p. 40.

2 See also Rowley's book *Prophecy and Religion in Ancient China and Israel* (London, 1956). For certain reservations, *cf.* the review of this book by G. A. Kennedy, *JBL* 76 (1957), 81.

status of a historical figure in some areas of critical scholarship. But even without an assist from archaeological science Rowley makes a good case of Moses' historicity. Rowley presents a most effective illustration of the unique last medium (the blend of personality and event) which he says is the only medium unique to Israel. He points out that no sacrifice has been offered by the Jews for the past nineteen centuries—an accident of history? Perhaps. But also a fulfillment of the Christian contention that no further sacrificing of this sort is necessary and that certain pertinent Old Testament statements have been fulfilled.

Rowley's reference to the drought in David's reign (I Sam. 21:1 ff.) as an example of divine displeasure and of revelation through nature is correct.[3] However, the reviewer feels that it is more directly related to Saul's violation of the covenant made by Joshua and Israel with the Gibeonite confederacy. The consequence of the violation, in this instance, was a plague.[4]

The reviewer would also hesitate before accepting Rowley's suggestion of the use of sympathetic magic in the case of Zedekiah (I Kings 22:11) or Jeremiah (Jer. 27:1 f.).[5] He would prefer to treat these as cases of symbolic actions as in many other instances among the prophets. Rowley rightly points out that divination was rare among the Israelites, the chief example being the Urim and Thummim. The reviewer would suggest the possibility of a pair of dice rather than two flat stones as suggested by Rowley, though in either instance, it can only be a suggestion at this point.

In his second chapter, "The Nature of God," Rowley asserts that the God of the Old Testament is the God of experience, not of speculation. There is no question as to whether God exists but the discussions relate to his character. The writer discusses the names of God (Elohim, Jahweh, *et al.*), and reaffirms the personal character of God and his relationship with his people. There follows a good description of biblical miracles which aids materially in making the Old Testament far more relevant to the present situation. He points out that the God of the Old Testament is in every way ethical and that "the religion of Israel is ethical in its essence, not merely in its demands"[6]—a helpful corrective to some of the overly legalistic descriptions of the Old Testament.

Another important observation is that God's will is accomplished through a human or natural agency but God does not violate man's integrity. Rowley again widens the horizon of our understanding of Old Testament prophecy when he not

3 Rowley, *op. cit.*, p. 25 f.

4 For details, see Abraham Malamat, "Doctrines of Causality in Hittite and Biblical Historiography: A Parallel," *Vetus Testamentum* V (1955), 1-12, in which Hittite analogues to the situation are discussed. For possible covenant form, *cf.* G. E. Mendenhall, *Law and Covenant in Israel and the Ancient Near East* (Pittsburgh, The Biblical Colloquim). For other points of view *cf.* H. Cazelles, "David's Monarchy and the Gibeonite Claim," *Palestine Exploration Quarterly* 1955, 165-175; A. Kapelrud, "King and Fertility," *Interpretationes ad Vetus Testamentum pertinentes Signundo Mowinckel* (Oslo, 1955), pp. 113-123; J. Pedersen, *Israel* (Copenhagen, 1946), pp. 383-385. Cazelle and Kapelrud approach the passage from a liturgical or religious and political point of view while Pedersen treats it as an act of vengeance.

5 Rowley, *op. cit.*, p. 27 f.

6 *Ibid.*, p. 59.

only includes Moses among the prophets (as did the Old Testament, *cf.* Deut. 34:10) but also notes some of the implications of this inclusion. Rowley continues by describing the characteristics of God as understood by the Old Testament writers: compassionate, saving (with election a privilege but with responsibilities), just, loving (part of just, not opposed to it), holy, faithful, true, and electing (with a discussion of the significance of the covenant). He concludes this chapter with a discussion of monotheism.

The reviewer feels that Rowley's discussion of the meaning of Jahweh would have been improved by not dismissing the relevance of the etymology of the name, Jahweh.[7] The meaning "He who causes hosts to come into existence" has definite historical and theological implications which ought not be overlooked.[8]

The writer's discussion of the structure and significance of the covenant[9] would have been appreciably strengthened by the material collected by Mendenhall in the monograph mentioned above which possibly appeared after the present work was in press.[10]

One wishes that there had been more space available for a longer discussion of the vitally important concept of *hesedh,* especially utilizing the work of Nelson Glueck which is mentioned but once.[11] The reviewer would also feel that the implicit evidence for Mosaic monotheism is far stronger than Rowley would allow.[12] That the implications of Mosaic monotheism were better understood at a later time may certainly be granted, but this does not preclude a much more rigid monotheism in Moses' day than the writer allows. Indeed, the traditions associated with Moses, Joshua and the judges require it.

The third chapter, "The Nature and Need of Man" begins with a discussion of man as a creature of God, privileged yet with commensurate responsibilities. Man is capable of fellowship with God and thus distinct from all other forms of life and this "makes possible the divine inspiration of man."[13] Rowley discusses the knotty problem of *nephesh* and *ruah* and concludes, rightly, that no one definition is adequate. Man may speak for God and represent him but he is never identified with God. The "image of God" in no way means that man is God's physical likeness. Rowley also points out that the prohibition of idols did not preclude the making of images until much later in Israel's history than Moses' day.

In his discussion of sin, Rowley asserts that while sin always involves man, it is basically directed against God. God reacts in justice to discipline man rather than to penalize him, though the latter occasionally appears in the Old Testament. "In the Garden of Eden the blessing of obedience was the fellowship of God which

7 *Ibid.,* p. 53 ff.
8 For a detailed discussion of this etymology, see W. F. Albright, *Journal of Biblical Literature,* 67 (1948), 377-381.
9 Rowley, *op. cit.,* p. 68 f.
10 See note No. 4.
11 Rowley, *op. cit.,* p. 70, n. 1.
12 *Ibid.,* p. 71.
13 *Ibid.,* p. 73.

was broken by disobedience."[14] This fellowship is not characterized by the easy familiarity with God suggested by popular songs of the day and occasionally from our pulpits. The term "salvation" does not always refer to the rescue of man by God but may refer to other areas of action. This important observation must be borne in mind in the exegesis of passages in which this term appears.

Ritual and some form of sacrifice undoubtedly characterized Israel's religion from the very beginning, Rowley properly observes. The reviewer heartily agrees with Rowley's qualification of the commonly suggested opinion that Israel's sacrificial ritual was borrowed essentially from the Canaanites. Sacrifice is much more complex than the sweeping generalizations frequently made would indicate. There were certainly later additions (including Canaanite) to the sacrificial practice—one might compare the development of Christian worship practices here. But even in borrowing there was re-interpretation. Sacrifice was never held to be effective in itself but was always dependent upon the one sacrificing. When this was acceptable, God responded favorably to it. The act of penitence of itself could not assure forgiveness either—only God could forgive in response to the act of man. "Divine forgiveness does not cancel all the effects of sin, . . . the only true penitence is a genuine horror of the sin and not a selfish desire to avoid its consequences."[15] Rowley concludes this chapter with a discussion of the individual and community implications of these practices by extending them in II Isaiah to a universalistic concept of sacrifice.

To his illustrations of the heavenly court[16] Rowley could have added Isaiah 40:2 ff.[17] The reviewer feels that Rowley makes more of Amos 5:6 than the context allows.[18] Amos 5:3-6 is a small collection of proverbs which illustrates a cause and effect relationship reaching its climax in verses 7 and 8. It would have been well in this instance had he used the RSV rather than the KJV.

In the excellent discussion of sacrifice, a careful study of which would eliminate some of the oversimplified statements made in many circles, it becomes apparent that the offering of money, prayer, etc., within the Christian context is capable of being understood as sacrifice in a certain Old Testament sense.[19] To avoid certain connotations we use different terms, but the acts themselves are essentially the same,—even in their abuse!

One of the most significant chapters in the book is "Individual and Community" because of its importance for bringing back something of the concept of the believing community, found in both the Old and New Testaments, and the consequences it has for individual Christians. In this chapter Rowley discusses man as an individual responsible to God whose actions have implications for the com-

14 *Ibid.*, p. 81.
15 *Ibid.*, p. 97.
16 *Ibid.*, p. 80.
17 *Cf.* F. M. Cross, Jr., "The Council of Yahweh in Second Isaiah," *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* 12 (1953), 274-277; Cross' discussion is also pertinent to Rowley's n. 2, page 90.
18 Rowley, *op. cit.*, p. 82.
19 *Ibid.*, esp. p. 94 f.

munity of which he is a part. The community is likewise responsible to God; thus there may be innocent members of a community who will have to suffer along with the guilty. Religion is not man's private concern but is of social significance. There is a good development in this chapter of the individual's integral role in the community and hence a good corrective to much of the indifference found among us so far as the responsibility for our actions to the community is concerned. The Old Testament, according to Rowley, in no way supports a contention that God is responsible for the wrongs committed by an individual or a nation but man is free and morally responsible for his own actions. Rowley properly insists that this concept of the individual long antedates Jeremiah and Ezekiel but its emphasis by these prophets is the result of the effort by their contemporaries to fix the responsibility for events upon their fathers whose sins were now being punished.

Man's actions have importance not only for the present but also for the future. Man is not only a part of the contemporary society but belongs to the past and to the future.

The actions of leaders bear even greater implications of responsibility—an important note of advice to contemporary politicians. The Deuteronomic emphasis seems to be reciprocal: evil—punishment, good—blessing, but many Old Testament stories do not support this equation. Rowley uses the story of Joseph as one example, and there are many others.

The writer also points out that the new covenant referred to in the early sixth century prophets had both individual and collective import. He is surely correct when he suggests that the Servant in Isaiah refers at various times to Israel, the nation, and to an individual.

He discusses the book of Job as an attempt to explain the problem of suffering and contrasts this with the Deuteronomic emphasis. The reviewer would prefer the suggestion of Samuel Terrien[20] that the problem of Job is essentially "Does man serve God for nothing?" with the common human experience of suffering used as the means of discussion. The reviewer would also suggest the "occasion" for the composition of Job might well be an effort to correct the Deuteronomic emphasis. The Deuteronomic history (Deuteronomy, Joshua, Judges, I and II Samuel, I and II Kings) and Job are roughly contemporaneous works.

Rowley then discusses the corporate personality (community viewed as an individual) and concludes with a survey of the ideas of the Remnant and the Servant in II Isaiah.

Of immediate importance is Rowley's discussion of "The Good Life" (Chap. 5) in which he points out that the good life is one of fellowship with God, the *summum bonum* for the believer, in which one serves but is not a slave, in which obedience is not only to a ritual but has moral and spiritual demands. He properly points out that it is futile to restrict ethical religion to the 8th century prophets and their successors but rather extends it back to the time of Moses, if not earlier.

20 Samuel Terrien, "The Book of Job. Introduction and Exegesis," *Interpreter's Bible,* Vol. 3 (Nashville, 1954), pp. 897 f., 914 f.

For example, perversion of justice is condemned in the Book of the Covenant (Ex. 23:6), honesty in commercial transactions is commanded in Deuteronomy 25:18, 13) and the Holiness Code (Lev. 19:15). Especially pertinent is Rowley's emphasis that the prophetic demand was primarily religious, not social, though of course the latter is involved. Justice and mercy were not to be separated in interpersonal relations any more than they are in God's dealings with man. What may be just but would work a hardship should be tempered with mercy. This kind of mercy is a sort of *hesedh* between a man and his fellow.

As a result, sexual promiscuity is everywhere condemned but the family life is everywhere extolled. Monogamy is held to be best but not exclusively required. God is sexless but the creator of all. The family virtues are a way of showing holiness in life as well as loftiness of spirit, integrity of character, consecration to God. The reviewer would note that, with this approach, it is quite proper to see the Song of Songs for what it really is: a collection of love songs. Love between a man and his wife is proper before God and its physical expression a natural part of it, and not singly the procreation of the race which is also accomplished in a similar way by the lesser members of God's creation.

Love of God is linked to reverence. The section on the necessity of worship to the good life should be required reading for anyone who alleges that worship is not a necessary part of a believer's life. The prophets condemned its abuse, not use; they used the Temple themselves and saw it as the gathering place of the restored Israel and the nations who would accept Jahweh as their God. In this connection, Rowley again emphasizes the close association of the prophets and the priests. Jesus, of course, eliminated the need for further sacrifice of given types, but he nowhere condemned it; in fact, he even commanded it (Luke 17:14). Rowley seems to join with those who suggest an Exilic origin for the synagogue, but the Temple was still the main worship center for more than a half millenium after this. Actually, the temple was an exclusive worship center only briefly (during part of the reign of Hezekiah and Josiah).

Though the Sabbath became a day of worship, Rowley maintains that initially it was only a day of rest. It was a pre-Mosaic institution.

Temple worship included more than sacrificial worship in the usual sense. It was a house of prayer in both the Old and the New Testaments and prayer included adoration as well as petition. Prayer, of course, was not limited to the sanctuary but was possible anywhere and could be quite informal in nature. The prophets experienced close fellowship with God in their private lives. The good life had to include worship. The righteous man was one in a right relationship with God and this included all these things. One could not really separate "church life" from "daily life"—they were one and the same.

The reviewer feels that the time has come for a re-study of the use of *doulos,* servant, slave, in the New Testament from the Semitic point of view in which *'ebed* meant not only houseboy but also major domo, not only slave, but also prime minister. It is quite possible that the meaning of many New Testament passages escapes us because of too limited a definition of *doulos.*

Rowley's discussion of servant and slave at the beginning of this chapter is useful but its implications, perhaps for lack of space, are insufficiently examined.

One must agree with Rowley that it remains impossible to determine the precise date of any Psalm but it would have been in order to point out that not only are a good number of them pre-exilic but some, whole or in part, are even pre-tenth century or earlier in all likelihood, *e.g.,* Pss. 18,[21] 29,[22] 68,[23] 77,[24] 92 to 96,[25] 144,[26] and others.[27]

The sixth chapter, "Death and Beyond," provides many helpful corrections to several popular ideas about the subject as presented in the old Testament. We would agree that biblical anthropology sees man as continuing to exist after death, and not as the animals which do not, in spite of certain passages which at first reading seem to suggest extinction for man at death. For the believer, life is a blessing, not a curse. Thus we might add to Rowley's discussion, that Christian asceticism as we observe its development from the third century on is really not consistent with the biblical approach to life on earth.

The New Testament is much more explicit on matters of the after-life. Rowley correctly observes that Paul anticipated no waiting period between death and life in Christ's presence. We might add, neither did Jesus (*cf.* Luke 23:43). And again, biblical anthropology allows no such period. Throughout his discussion, Rowley correctly emphasizes the distinction between Greek and Hebrew ideas. The New Testament ideas of the afterlife are incipient in the Old but one should not read back into the Old, ideas from the New.

There was no belief in re-incarnation in Jahwism but there is a concern in the Old Testament for proper burial after death, indicating a belief in some kind of existence after death and possibly some relationship between this life and the next. Necromancy, though condemned, shows a belief in an afterlife and the incident of the witch of Endor is consistent with biblical anthropology in that Samuel is no mere ghost or disembodied soul, as would be in the case in Greek thought.

There is a good discussion of the idea of Sheol. It began as a gathering place of the dead, good and bad. It was sometimes viewed as unattractive, and out of

21 Cf. F. M. Cross, Jr., and D. N. Freedman, "A Royal Song of Thanksgiving: II Sam. 22, Ps. 18," *JBL* 72 (1953), 15-35.

22 W. F. Albright, "The Psalm of Habakkuk," *Studies in Old Testament Prophecy* (Edinburgh, 1950), p. 6 ff.; F. M. Cross, Jr., "Notes on a Canaanite Psalm in the Old Testament," *BASOR* 117 (Feb., 1950), 19-21.

23 W. F. Albright, "A Catalogue of Early Hebrew Lyric Poems" (Psalm LXVIII), *Hebrew Union College Annual* 23:1 (1950-1951), 1-39. *Ibid.,* "Notes on Psalms 68 ad 134," *Interpretationes, op. cit.,* pp. 1-12.

24 W. F. Albright, *ibid.*

25 W. F. Albright, *ibid.*

26 Cross and Freedman, *op. cit., passim.*

27 For a survey of Ugaritic and the Psalms, *cf.* J. H. Patton, *Canaanite Parallels in the Book of Psalms* (Baltimore, 1944). For an opposing point of view, especially in applicability of Ugaritic materials, *cf.* Sigmund Mowinckel, "Psalm Criticism between 1900 and 1935," *Vetus Testamentum* 5 (1955), 13-33; for a good summary of Mowinckel's influence upon the study of Psalms, see John M. Stensvaag, "Recent Approaches to the Psalms," *Lutheran Quarterly* 9 (1957), 195-212.

contact with the earth; elsewhere it is in contact with the present and aware of the future. Sheol is a place of isolation from God, yet God's power extends there. Rowley suggests that this concept of Sheol may be part of Israel's tradition, not a matter of revelation, and was shared with many other peoples, especially the Babylonians in this instance. There is really nothing unique about the idea of Sheol in Israel as compared with ideas of the afterlife among Israel's neighbors.

Resurrection from the dead is consistent with the development of Hebrew religion and is not borrowed from (1) Greek ideas of the immortality of the soul or (2) Persian Zoroastrianism or (3) from Egyptian cult of Osiris (*cf.* Syrian Adonis and Babylonian Tammuz rites). Israel was undoubtedly familiar with the last named, and occasional references reflect knowledge of certain rites associated with the cult but not the acceptance of them. They were related to the maintenance of fertility, not human resurrection. Rowley points out that Ezekiel 37:1-14 as it stands refers to national restoration and not human resurrection. Job 19:25 ff. is very unclear[28] but *may* refer to a resurrection. The Isaiah apocalypse (Chapters 24-27) may be interpreted nationally or individually. The only certain references to resurrection is in Daniel 12:2, coming from the early Maccabean period but even here it is only a selective resurrection and then seems to refer to life in this world, not another. Rowley points out that the Song of Hannah (I Sam. 2:6) does not refer to resurrection but to the fact that the issues of life and death are in God's hand. On the basis of Pss. 16, 49, and 73, he develops the idea that there is in the Old Testament an expectation of a life of bliss in the presence of God in another world. This continuing fellowship with God is the emphasis in the Enoch story, too (Gen. 5:21 ff.). God alone is the source of life. Throughout the discussion of "Death and Beyond," Rowley points out the need of carefully noting the important difference between God's revelation and man's apprehension of it. "But that revelation was mediated through human and fallible personality, and it is perilous to ascribe every statement directly to God. To do so would mean to equate God's revelation of himself with man's apprehension of that revelation, and to bring God down to the level of men's understanding of his nature and his will. All the variety of view of the afterlife contained in the Old Testament does not reveal the vacillating and uncertain mind of God, but the imperfect apprehension by men of the truth which is hidden in God's heart."[29]

The reviewer would urge caution in identifying any of the details of Revelation with specific beliefs.[30] This Rowley seems to do in the case of the first and second resurrections of Revelation, a reference which has resulted in much unnecessary strain between some Christians. This caution is especially in place in the light of a paper (as yet unpublished to the reviewer's knowledge) by Prof. Massey H. Shepherd, Jr.[31] In this paper, Prof. Shepherd points out that the outline and setting

28 The reviewer plans to discuss the passage in detail in the near future.

29 Rowley, *op. cit.*, p. 154.

30 *Ibid.*, p. 152.

31 Professor of Liturgics at the Church Divinity School of the Pacific. The paper was presented before the Pacific Coast Section of the Society of Biblical Literature and Exegesis,

of Revelation is that of the Paschal liturgy, cast in figurative and symbolic terms in order to accomplish the commonly accepted purpose of the book, viz., the comfort and encouragement of Christians undergoing prosecution. It should not be taken as a catechism of early Christian beliefs regarding the afterlife for the movement of the Paschal liturgy traces man's progress from the interrogation of the catechumen to the exaltation of the communicant, which is a way of putting into the mold of worship the process of sanctification and the pilgrimage of man through the uncertainties of life's way to the certainty to the gate of heaven. One may thus say that Revelation presents the Christian understanding of the afterlife but not *literally* the events preceding the Christian's advent to that Blessed State.

The reviewer feels that the significance of Amos 2:1 is to be found elsewhere perhaps than in a concern on the part of the prophet, and Israel, for the post-mortem state of the king of Edom.[32] The Moabites had a history of the practice of human sacrifice (*cf.* II Kings 3:4 ff.). The term "king of Edom" in the consonantal text appears as *mlk 'dm,* which is found in Punic inscriptions with the meaning, "a *molk* (= infant sacrifice) offered by a man" or "a human sacrifice."[33] It is possible that the memory of Mesha's shocking immolation of his son on the wall of Kir-hareseth (modern Kerak) nearly a century earlier is suggested by Amos' reference here or the practice of human sacrifice offered to Chemosh by the Moabites and practiced among the Israelites themselves as a part of their worship of Baal. Amos' condemnation would thus apply to both Moabite and Israelite practice and would seem to be much more probable than any concern for the bones of the king of Edom and his fate after death. So the passage in Amos would have the meaning, " . . . because his burning(s) of a human sacrifice are many," or something similar.[34] This would then continue logically with the sacrifice of Moab by fire, as it were, as described in the following verse.

April 12, 1957, "The Paschal Liturgy and the Book of Revelation." *Cf.* also Cullmann, *Early Christian Worship, passim;* O. A. Piper, "The Apocalypse of John and the Liturgy of the Ancient Church," *Church History* 20 (1951), 10-22 (called to my attention by Richard E. Graef).

32 Rowley, *op. cit.,* p. 155.

33 After this review was written, the reviewer discovered a brief note to this effect by M. Dahood, S.J., in *CBQ* 17 (1955), 104.

The meaning, "blood sacrifice" suggested by J. G. Fevrier in *Revue d'histoire des Religions* 143 (1953), 12 f., does not appear to be as probable. Biblical *molech* has been shown to be actually *molk,* a technical term for a sacrifice, at first referring to infant sacrifice, *cf.* Lev. 18:21; 20:2-5; I Kings 11:7; II Kings 23:10; and Jer. 32:35; see W. F. Albright, *Archaeology and the Religion of Israel* (Baltimore, 1953), pp. 162 ff. The antiquity of the misunderstanding of the term involved is illustrated by the Septuagint references and by the quotation of Amos 5:25 f. in Acts 7:42 f. It might be noted parenthetically that both Sakkuth and Kaiwan in Amos 5:26 have appeared in Mesopotamian sources as astral deities. Later *molk* is used in combination with other terms to refer to a human sacrifice or the offering of a substitute for the human being. The reviewer plans to publish a survey of the materials which have appeared to date pertinent to *molk* in the Old Testament in the near future.

34 For an independent use of *'asûm* in the plural, meaning "many," *cf.* Prov. 7:26.

The dating of the Song of Moses (Deut. 32) is not quite as uncertain as Rowley implies. [35] There should be little doubt that it is pre-tenth century.[36]

In his final chapter, "The Day of the Lord," Rowley discusses the various ideas associated with this event in the Old Testament, beginning with the observation that the hope for a better day in the future is to be found throughout the Old Testament. The Day of the Lord in Amos seems to have been viewed popularly as a day of Israel's exaltation but Amos changed it to the day of Israel's moral judgment. Zechariah made it a day of general judgment. In Isaiah 24 it is followed by the Golden Age.

In contrast with the usual understanding of God's working through men and events, the Day of the Lord involved a more direct action by God. The prophets' terms are discussed. It is pointed out that the apocalyptic messages of the prophets grew out of the prophetic. The Golden Age, which is the gift of God, is universal in that sin with all of its concomitant injustices must first be removed. Hence it has a religious basis; it is not merely economic or political but it is moral and spiritual in content. Though not termed as such, it is "the Kingdom of God." Rowley correctly notes we still are seeking the ancient hope for economic security and enduring peace but now, as in the Old Testament, these are the result of universal submission to God! All Israel could do was prepare for the coming of the Golden Age; it was God's gift to man on *his* terms.

Rowley has the best discussion and defense of the RSV translation "bless themselves" in the Abrahamic covenant that the reviewer has yet read. He remains unconvinced, however, that it is a better translation than the passive, "shall be blessed." The sense of a universal sharing in the faith of Abraham and his descendants, according to Rowley, is illustrative of the universalism in the prophetic materials from Zephaniah on. Isaiah II (40-55) related the universalism of God (not salvation!) to the mission of Israel. Isa. 56-66 has the nations serving Israel and glorifying her (*cf.* the popular idea of Amos' day referred to above but with important differences). Therefore proselytes were a matter of concern. The most prominent proselyte was Ruth.

This is followed by a discussion of the meaning of the Messiah in the Old Testament. Jesus' reluctance to be called the Messiah is probably related to the popular connotation of the term in his day. Rowley discusses the Davidic leader and the passages referring to him. The description of his role recalls the terms describing the Golden Age: universal dominion of God, universal peace and universal justice. Each of the passages in question deals only partially with the Day of the Lord but with the Day is involved in all of them. The Son of Man is essentially a human figure throughout the Old Testament except for Daniel where it symbolizes the saints as invested with power. Yet in Daniel it is associated with the figure of the Golden Age, though not in the sense of the Davidic leader. Jesus' use of the term indicates that neither he nor his contemporaries identified Son of Man with

35 Rowley, *op. cit.*, p. 170.

36 See Frank M. Cross, Jr., and David Noel Freedman, "The Blessing of Moses," *JBL* 67 (1948), 191-210, and the references cited above, n. 21, for pertinent details.

the Davidic Messiah, though he was both and the two ideas were fused in him. The concepts dealt with different aspects of the expectation. The Suffering Servant and the Davidic leader are not identified in the Old Testament nor in Jesus' day (*cf.* the reluctance of the disciples to accept the idea of Jesus' suffering) though again they are not wholly unrelated. The Davidic leader was not to suffer for his people. Daniel 12 and Zechariah 8 may reflect Isaiah 53—all the figures are linked together in some way or other to the coming kingdom. The reviewer would go a bit further than Rowley's customary caution and suggest that the martyrdom of the Teacher of Righteousness in the Qumran scrolls is highly improbable.[37]

Rowley's concluding statement is excellent. In it he points out that the vision of the Suffering Servant is realized in Jesus but the Golden Age is still ahead. In the Old as in the New Testament it cannot come until we seek first the Kingdom of God.

On the whole, *The Faith of Israel* represents an excellent survey of current thinking on the matters discussed. Though it is not and was not intended to be a comprehensive work on Old Testament theology, it will provide the reader with an excellent introduction to the whole area and will provide him with an exhaustive bibliography, a Rowley trademark.[38] This readable, well written book should be in the library of every theological student and pastor.

37 *Cf.* F. M. Cross, Jr., *The Ancient Library of Qumran* (Garden City, N. Y., 1958), pp. 116 ff.

38 The reviewer noted only a couple of printers' errors: "Ps. 73" for "Ps. 78," p. 172, line 1; "gowing" for "glowing" on p. 197, line 26.

Correspondence and Comment

Lutherans in American History

In The Lutheran Quarterly for November, 1957 (IX, 321-342), I essayed a perhaps overly ambitious "tercentenary retrospect" entitled "The Lutheran Church and American Culture." My purpose was to survey the American history of Lutheranism with particular attention to the benefits which have accrued from the American democratic tradition and the threat to the "conservative Reformation tradition" posed by America's ultra-Protestant religious milieu. In doing this I dissented from the view which Professor A. R. Wentz expressed in his excellent *Basic History of American Lutheranism:* that "the Lutheran Church in America . . . is not an immigrant church that needed to be naturalized after it was transplanted" and that it is "an integral . . . part of American Christianity" (p. v). My two chief devices for expounding these matters were *first,* a loose periodization of American Lutheran history into three experiential phases: *Survival* (more or less the colonial period), *Definition* (more or less the nineteenth century), and *Consolidation* (since World War I); and *second,* the invoking of Marcus L. Hansen's "law" on immigrant attitudes to American culture: that the third generation tries to remember what the second sought to forget and what the first could not bear to part with or even alter.

In the Quarterly for August, 1958 (X, 269-272), Professor Wentz honored my essay with a provocative and amiable reply in which he took issue on three points: (1) my alleged program for "abstracting" Lutheran history from the context of American history, (2) my scheme of periodization, and (3) my use of Hansen's law. Because his remarks were eminently temperate and cogent I would not presume to publish a rejoinder if it did not seem that the related problems warranted further discussion; but because they have large significance not only for historians but for ecumenical attitudes and the whole conduct of the church, I do venture an extension of the discussion.

With regard to the first of his remarks (on abstractionism) I can only express regret that it was possible to construe my account as an attempt to remove church history from world history. In fact, my effort in that essay was rather to emphasize the tension-filled interaction between American Lutheran history and American history. My dwelling on the immigration experience, westward expansion, urbanization, the rise of suburbia, etc., was meant to underline this need. Not to proceed on this basis would, in the first place, involve a college teacher of American history like myself in departmental treason. But more importantly it would be to endorse an historiographical form of spiritualistic or sectarian error, requiring the repudiation of theological views on the orders of creation, the two *Regimenten,* the

nature of the church, the nature of man, and even Christology, which are central facets of Lutheran witness in our time.

What I did wish to do, on the other hand, was to highlight the tension that has prevailed between the Lutheran Church and "American Evangelical Protestanism" as I defined it. On this point, I would be willing to make my case even stronger than I did. Lutherans have had to make their way in a religious context which was overwhelmingly Reformed, Puritan, and "revivalized," anti-doctrinal, unliturgical, and "unionistic"; i.e., in a very unsympathetic ecclesiastical environment. The Galesburg Rule, for example, has been seen as a substantially "un-American" throw-back to mediaevalism by almost all Americans except Catholics (Roman, Orthodox, and Anglo-), Southern Baptists, and a vanishing race of old-school Presbyterians. When Clarence Kilde spoke of "the long cold winter of dark dogmatism which has for a century characterized the diaspora culture of Midwest Lutheranism," he was voicing a typical American Protestant attitude (*Christianity & Crisis,* December 12, 1955). Lutherans have not been "encysted" by any means—they have felt the force of historical pressures from the beginning. But they *have* been denominationally isolated—and only incidentally by language, far more importantly by theological principle. And if this situation be somewhat altered at the present time (which I think it is), the reason lies largely in the changed theological temper of American Protestantism.

Now to get back to my original comment on Dr. Wentz's comprehensive and judicious *History:* my comment was that the "cliché version" of Lutheranism's American experience does more justice to the facts than an effort to emphasize its being an "integral . . . part of American Christianity"—unless this phrase be interpreted so broadly that Roman Catholics and Hutterites are also "integral" parts. My own impressions are that whenever someone tries to generalize about *The Spirit of American Christianity* (as did Ronald E. Osborn recently under that title), Lutherans are continually being excepted, along with their usual neighbors in "exceptionality." (In Osborn's book 14 of 18 references to Lutherans are to except them from generalizations.) Possibly Professor Wentz agrees with the foregoing; possibly I (and Dr. Marty, whom I quoted) have misinterpreted the nuances of his *History.* If so, I express my regrets and my apologies; but yet also my gratitude, for I do think that a recognition of the fact has important consequences.

Professor Wentz also found flaws in my periodization. And frankly I do too—just as I find overlapping and imprecision in the use of other age-concepts (mediaeval, Renaissance, Augustan, Victorian, etc.). But I must plead that I was not proposing a "new outline of Lutheran history in America." I was simply trying to make some sense out of 300 years of history in what was originally a forty-minute address. To have barnacled so brief an essay with all the necessary qualifications would have sunk it. But I would defend the proposition that down through the first third of the nineteenth century, "survival" of a recog-

nizable Church of the Augsburg Confession was a continuing problem. Lutherans were drifting away or conforming themselves from within to the American Protestant pattern. The formation of the General Synod, Gettysburg, a goodly number of worthies, and, above all, immigration changed the trend. As for my "age of definition," I can only say that the enormously significant controversy, organization, alignments and realignments that took place give the age a sufficient measure of unity to deserve a name, while the forming of the ELC, ULC, NLC, and ALC serve in a sense to mark the end of one era and the beginning of another.

With regard to "generations," I suspect Marcus Hansen would be appalled to see anyone taking his words so strictly, and I too am a bit shaken. It happens that I am in cold fact of the third generation; but in my essay I meant merely to suggest that the state of mind, the temper, or the stance of present-day Lutheranism has the characteristics which Hansen so sensitively ascribed to the "third generation." By and large the contradictory pulls of the Ideal-Second-Generation-Type are past; the language question is dead. There may be some enclaves where a member of the eighth generation inherits the syndrome of the first; there are also many Lutherans and some Lutheran churches holding still other views because of their late immigration (or even recent arrival); but both of these instances are exceptions. I think that Lutherans in America are now evaluating their heritage without worrying whether or not they are sufficiently "Americanized." Membership-loss of the Second-Generation-Type is negligible; I suspect that mixed marriages and the proximity of other churches account for most of the lay losses; theological issues, of the clergy losses. Few are any longer seeking "more American" churches. This is not to say, however, that I am identifying this new state of mind with Christian freedom. *Der böse Feind* can turn any state of mind to his ends—and I am sure he does.

Let me add in conclusion that my essay was not intended as a study in objectivity. Without subscribing to Charles Beard's dictum that "history [writing is] an act of faith," I will admit that my essay was not untinctured by advocacy. In the first place, I was and am thankful that Lutherans are free of compulsions attributable to the naturalization process when they evaluate their tradition in its homiletical, exegetical, catechetical, liturgical, hymnological, and doctrinal dimensions (and I want every one of those adjectives). Beyond that, I was urging that we apprehend and appropriate this heritage in all of its evangelical and catholic depth. That, too, is a cliché of sorts, but I have further cause for gratitude in that Dr. Wentz did not dissent from it. Consensus here can mean much. My only lingering *caveat* is that we remain mindful that American Lutheran history has not always been marked by the absence of dissent on this score—nor is it now. My hope, finally, is that we cherish and use the limited grant of freedom which historical retrospect can give.

Sydney E. Ahlstrom

Book Reviews and Notices[1]

Prophetic Faith in Isaiah. By Sheldon H. Blank. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958. 241 pages. $3.75.

The picture of the Isaiah of history, the eighth century contemporary of Hezekiah, which emerges from Dr. Blank's study is that of a stern, gloomy, thoroughly unpleasant prophet who "broadcast black forebodings and shouted his agonized warnings." The joyous, hopeful, divinely confident person whom we usually associate with the book to which Isaiah bequeathed his name is simply a contribution of the "later Isaiahs"—the Isaiah of legend, the Second Isaiah, the several Trito's, the apocalyptic and messianic Isaiahs. In the best tradition of incisive and ruthless critical scholarship, Professor Blank attempts to identify as many of them as possible by their differing words and emphases.

The marvelous way in which verses and parts of verses chosen at random are fitted together to create all these "nameless shadows" is ingenious. The method leaves no room for any kind of biblical theology. That there might be a possibility of paradox in the theological expression of any of the Isaiahs is not even suggested. It is taken for granted that a man can hold only one unqualified position. A concession is made to the possibility of a kind of unity in the concluding chapter, when Professor Blank suggests that all the Isaiahs seem to have in common a hopeful faith. But he takes it back in the next breath in stating that they differ both as to the basis and the source of faith. In a previous chapter he had stated that their very concepts of faith were different.

"Man takes the first step," is the concluding statement of the book. Here Professor Blank lays bare his hand, for it is evident that the very picture of God in his study of the prophet is man-made. It is presupposed by Blank's own clever piecing together of verses.

As Christian theologians we are often wont to read Isaiah into the New Testament. Professor Blank, as a Jewish theologian, gives us a reading as one should expect which is entirely cut off from any Christian presuppositions. There is only one allusion to the New Testament in the entire book, and that is to Paul's quotation in Romans 2:22-24 of Isaiah 52:5, which he declares is a misreading caused by Paul's use of the Septuagint rather than the Masoretic text.

There are some real values in this well-written, in some paragraphs eloquent book. Especially illuminating are the analyses of some of the great Hebrew terms: *Mishpat* (Justice), *Sedakah* (Righteousness), *Yeshu 'ah* (Salvation), as well as the names of deity, *'Elohim, Yahweh,* and *'El.* The fact that an index to Hebrew terms has been included makes these stimulating well-documented word studies quickly available.

ROBERT H. BOYD

Bible Key Words from Gerhard Kittel's Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament, Volume II. Translated and edited by J. R. Coates and H. P. Kingdon. New York: Harpers and Brothers, 1958. $4.00.

This volume is a highly welcome addition to the current series of selected translations from the Kittel Wörterbuch. The first volume included articles on Love, Church, Sin, and Righteousness. This one deals with the concepts *Lord, Gnosis, Basileia,* and *Apostleship.* Every student of the New Testament knows the Kittel *Wörterbuch* as an almost indispensable tool. Its uniqueness lies in the attempt to trace the changing meaning and content of words from the O.T. and Septuagint through the Apocrypha and Rabbinica, and from primitive Greek usage through the religious, philosophical, and pro-

1 Books reviewed or noticed in these pages may be purchased through your church's publication house.

fane literature of Hellenism to the New Testament. The authors of these articles move constantly from cataloguing the usage of a given word to analyzing its finest shades of meaning. At times the reader is apt to suspect an attempt at over-subtlety as, e.g., in Bultmann's derivation of Johannine gnosis from Gnosticism, or in Rengstorff's distinction of pempō and apostellō. But this is a danger which has to be risked if we are to penetrate to the real meaning of Scripture.

The article on *Kyrios* is the joint labor of Werner Foerster and Gottfried Quell. It includes, among other chapters, a very clear presentation by Quell on the Yahweh name in the O.T., and a helpful discussion by Foerster on the substitution of Kyrios for Yahweh in the Septuagint.

Bultmann's article on *Gnosis* is outstanding for its lucid juxtaposition of the classical Greek, Gnostic, and Old Testament meanings of *Gnosis*. In the section on *Basileia* Gerhard von Rad deals somewhat sketchily with *Melek* and *Malkûth* in the O.T., K. L. Schmidt treats of *Basileia* in a rather lexicalic manner, but K. G. Kuhn has an excellent synopsis on *Malkuth Shamayim* in Rabbinic literature.

The article by K. H. Rengstorff on *Apostleship* is excitingly relevant to the present day Anglican-versus-Lutheran debate on apostolic succession, for it clearly establishes apostleship as a function that is unique and unrepeatable.

Both translators must be commended for their very fine work in translating these articles. Very little has been omitted and the bibliographies have been substantially enlarged by the addition of relevant English works. One can only hope that much more of the *Wörterbuch* will be made available in English.

U. S. Leupold

The Book of God. By Baruch Spinoza. New York: Philosophical Library, 1958. 121 pages. $3.00.

The indefatigable D. D. Runes has in this volume published a portion of a little-known work of Spinoza (1632-1677), which antedated the latter's classic *Ethics* (1677). The original was entitled: *A Short Treatise on God, Man, and his Well-Being* (published before 1661). Mr. Runes has edited the present volume from A. Wolf's translation which was published in England in 1910.

Actually there is nothing in this volume which could not be better read in the later *Ethics*. The *Short Treatise* was a kind of *Urethik*, a tentative draft of that which was later perfected in the *Ethics*. It has many of the characteristics of the latter—the geometrical method, the thesis that there is no finite substance, etc.

Mr. Runes, in his introduction, makes rather extravagant claims for his edition—"A Guide for the Bewildered," calling Spinoza "the Philosopher of Modern Times, as Aristotle stood as the philosopher of Antiquity." It is doubtful whether the bewildered contemporary reader will be much attracted to either the method or the content of this treatise. Spinoza's God is not a personal, but an impersonal deity. Having neither intellect nor will, God acts from the necessity of his nature. (Where Spinoza is far more interesting and original is in the domain of biblical criticism, not touched on in this treatise.) Spinoza had a high estimate of Christ, remarking that "the wisdom of God took upon itself in Christ human nature and that he is the way of salvation" (*Tractatus*). Nevertheless, to say that God took on human nature was considered by Spinoza to be unintelligible.

So, those interested in Spinoza and unable to lay hold of the complete translation of the *Short Treatise* can in this book get an idea of the earlier Spinoza.

Wm. H. K. Narum

Psychoanalysis and Christianity. By Arvid Runestam. Augustana Press, 1958. $3.00.

This is a revised edition of a work that first appeared twenty-five years ago. It is an able translation from the Swedish by Oscar Winfield of Gustavus Adolphus College. The author has been professor of Dogmatics and Moral Theology at Uppsala University and Lutheran Bishop of the Diocese of Karlstad. He retired in 1957.

Runestam assigns himself the task of comparing the liberation offered by psychoanalysis and that presented by Christianity. He begins by examining the phenomenon of

repression, asking what is the moral quality involved in the nervous anxiety which repression causes. His conclusion is that guilt is the basis of nervousness and that the major repression is the repression of spiritual values and goals. Because of this he feels that psychoanalysis in itself is incapable of genuine liberation because it has eliminated the divine background to human conflicts. By putting its emphasis on a monistically regarded life stream—an impersonal flow of energy—within each personality, it has removed the human being from the realm of ethical values of both law and duty. Because of this it exempts a person from guilt through its deterministic outlook, and thereby becomes a real danger to his spiritual health and his religio-moral future. That which is missing in such a deliverance is moral seriousness—"a consciousness of the radically evil in human nature."

The liberation of psychoanalysis therefore is not profound liberation. Rather it is "wing-clipped" liberation. The patient is liberated from a conflict that could have deepened his life both in terms of seriousness and joy—all this at the expense of being made harmonious by an analyst. Commenting on Pfister's concern that he not relieve too many of the repressions of artists lest they lose their creativity, the author maintains that though we are not all artists, we are all creative beings—in this world to do something with our lives. We, too, need the repressions—the moral battles—the sense of guilt. We too will lose our creativity if we are dependent only on psychoanalysis for soul care. It is God and his love alone that can liberate us from the law without destroying the ethical content of life. This is the doctrine of Christian liberty—that God alone can make relativism possible in the moral demand without affecting the moral standard. True liberation must be an ethical liberation. "The soul can live only in ethical release."

In terms of soul care Runestam is concerned that the Christian pastor not go overboard with psychoanalysis, so that his admiration for these "partial discoveries about the soul" does not cause him to overlook the differences in the basic interpretation of the soul, and hence neglect his chief function as a pastor. The psychoanalyst is a technician who with learned skills attempts an intrapsychic liberation by reorganizing forces already present in the soul. Christian salvation has an eternal dimension—it is salvation "in the clutch of another." The Christian pastor attempts not only to liberate, but to attach the individual to the person of Christ.

His second concern regarding soul care is that the Christian pastor should not view his task solely as one of proclamation—of preaching, and so neglect personal work and individual soul care. His concern is based primarily on conditions in the European church which has not had the emphasis on clinical pastoral education that we have experienced in America. Nevertheless, what he goes on to say has real relevance for the American Church. His emphasis is on the distinction between psychiatry and Christian soul care. Christian soul care centers in the radical perspective of man's divine reorientation. Consequently it should yield blessings far beyond the "mere resolving of mundane marriage problems." This we need to hear!

What is the role of psychoanalysis from a Christian point of view? Beyond the team work concept in which psychoanalysis prepares the patient to respond to Christian pastoral care, Runestam has little to offer except to imply that more thought and research is needed in this area. He concludes that no comparison between psychoanalysis and Christian soul care can be satisfactory because they are doing radically different tasks.

This is a book that needs to be read in American Christian circles. We are drifting into a concept of pastoral counseling that makes of it little more than second-rate clinical psychology with a religious increment—the plus! Runestam can help us restore our sights to the radically unique ministry of Christian soul care. His treatment of the Freudian, Adlerian and religious humanism schools of psychoanalytic thought is adequate and often thorough. One only wishes that he could have turned his attention also to Carl Gustav Jung.

William E. Hulme

The Christian Tradition and the Unity We Seek. By Albert C. Outler. New York: Oxford University Press, 1957. 165 pages. $3.25.

This little book by Dr. Outler, which originated as the Richard Lectures at the University of Virginia, is a very sane and candid discussion of the church's ecumenical task and its problems. In this reviewer's opinion it is one of the best that has appeared recently.

He notes that the honeymoon of the church's ecumenical endeavor is over. It was an exciting time. Enthusiasm was generally high. The various churches of Christendom came to know and appreciate each other to a degree which is gratifying indeed. But there is much work still to be done before the church of Jesus Christ can be said to be really united, much hard work, harder even than what has been done thus far. We have come to a point in the history of the ecumenical movement when we shall need seriously to appraise what has been accomplished and survey the unfinished work which lies ahead. Some of the "resistances" which have hampered progress in the past are still in evidence. He mentions three: inertia, despair of any real or final success, and the fear which almost every denominational group has of giving up something which holds a treasured place in its traditions. These resistances must be overcome before the ecumenical task can go on much farther. Some of the knotty questions of theology and polity which we have been more or less skirting by answers which come short of basic solutions must be faced candidly and courageously. "Residual problems," he calls them. The most important of them, he thinks, are the nature of the church, the ministry, and the sacraments. These problems are of a dimension and importance which enlist not only the genius of a few of the church's leaders. "Now, more than ever before, the churches themselves must be brought along; and the future of the movement begins to depend more and more upon the vigor and vision of the church-leadership (clerical and lay) rather than on the wisdom and diligence of the secretariat of the World Council."

The title of the first chapter, "The Ecumenical Fact," might well be called the key to the whole book. Whereas the idea has too often prevailed that the purpose of the ecumenical endeavor is to bring about unity, the fact is that basic unity already exists. No church group, he says, is absolutely complacent about the dividedness of the church—evidence of a basic unity, a unity without which it could not be concerned about the church's fragmentation. Dr. Outler quotes and agrees with William Temple: "We could not seek union if we did not already possess unity. Those who have nothing in common do not deplore their estrangement." Work on Faith and Order does not create, but clarifies and confirms "ecumenical reality." Only as we recognize this basic unity among the various Christian churches is there any hope of solving the "residual problems," because only in that kind of orientation are we able to distinguish better that which is essential and that which, though important in our own separate tradition, is peripheral to the central fact of the Christ event which creates true community.

THEO. I. JENSEN